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ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE IN
FIRST AMENDMENT DEFAMATION LAW
CATHERINE HANCOCK*
“[I]t is questionable whether in principle the [Sullivan ac-
tual malice requirement for libel plaintiffs] can be limited
[to public officials].  A candidate for public office would
seem an inevitable candidate for extension . . . . Once
that extension was made, the participant in public debate
on an issue of grave public concern would be next in
line.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Today it is not possible to think about the contours of First
Amendment doctrine that regulates defamation actions without
thinking immediately of the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the
great constitutional divide between “public figures” and “private
figures.”  This doctrinal distinction is the basis for determining
whether a plaintiff will be required, as a public figure, to prove a
defendant’s “actual malice,” or “high degree of awareness of the
probable falsity” of the defamatory speech that is alleged to harm
the plaintiff’s reputation.2  Every plaintiff seeks to achieve the status
* Professor of Law, Tulane Law School.  This article is dedicated to the memory
of my colleague David Gelfand, who died tragically in Pensacola Beach during his evac-
uation from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.  David was a constant source of intel-
lectual camaraderie; his dedication to the First Amendment and his work to protect
civil rights made him a legend among students and colleagues.  I will miss David’s inimi-
table persona and love of life, and mourn his sudden passing for a long time to come.
1. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964).  This article is
a study of First Amendment libel law between 1964 and 1967 that served as a prelude to
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker. Butts and Walker were consoli-
dated for argument and decision, so references to Walker must be cited to the Butts
opinion. See 388 U.S. 133 (1967).  The terms “libel” and “defamation” are used inter-
changeably throughout the article.
2. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See infra note 8
for later definitions of actual malice. See also Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defama-
tion Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond:  An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV.
1349, 1370-73 (1975).  For a summary of defamation law before Sullivan, see, for exam-
ple, WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 106-111, at 754-828 (3d
81
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of a private figure in order to argue for liability based on negli-
gence.3  In spite of the complexities involved in making judicial as-
sessments of public or private figure status,4 the Supreme Court’s
commitment to the public figure doctrine has remained unwaver-
ing for over 30 years.5
The constitutional public figure concept first appeared in Cur-
tis Publishing Co. v. Butts,6 which was decided three years after New
York Times v. Sullivan7 established the actual malice standard as a
First Amendment requirement for public official plaintiffs.8  Judges
ed. 1964); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.1-5.30, at
349-473 (1959).
3. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 133 (extending actual malice standard to some public
figure plaintiffs); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (applying actual
malice standard to “all-purpose” and “limited purpose” public figures but rejecting it
for private figures).  Lower courts interpreted Gertz as allowing private figures to prove
only negligence to recover damages for actual injury to reputation, and the A.L.I. ap-
proved this position. Compare Alfred Hill, Defamation and Privacy under the First Amend-
ment, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1205, 1212 & n.25 (1976) (citing cases), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. c (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). Compare Gertz, 418 U.S. at
349 (holding that private figure must show actual malice to obtain punitive damages for
public concern speech), with Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749
(1985) (holding that private figure may obtain punitive damages for private concern
speech based on proof of negligence).
4. See generally 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 2.12 et seq., at 2-22-2-
151 (2d ed. 2003). See also id., § 2.24, at 2-35 (deriving nine factors from overlapping
standards used by lower courts); id., § 2.23, at 2-34.1-2.34.2 (discussing examples).
5. For early holdings determining public figure status, see, for example, Butts,
388 U.S. at 133 (public figures); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (private figure); Greenbelt Cooper-
ative Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (public figure); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976) (private figure); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979) (private figure); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (private figure).
6. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Harlan, J., plurality).  For an analysis of the complex
voting patterns in Butts and Walker, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First
Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275-78.
7. 376 U.S. 254, 280-81 (1964).  For monographs discussing Sullivan and its prog-
eny, see, for example, W. WAT HOPKINS, ACTUAL MALICE:  TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER
Times v. Sullivan 97-111 (1989); WILLIAM K. JONES, INSULT TO INJURY:  LIBEL, SLANDER,
AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY (2003); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW:  THE Sullivan CASE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1991); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN:
AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1986); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE
PRESS (1986).
8. For evolving definitions of actual malice after Sullivan, see Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 79, 74 (1964) (explaining that actual malice depends “on reckless
disregard for the truth,” and requires “a high degree of awareness” of “probable falsity”
of defamatory speech); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (noting that a
showing of “awareness of probable falsity” is based on evidence that a defendant “in fact
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in the post-Sullivan, pre-Butts era were preoccupied with the tasks
of defining the “public official” category and deciding whether to
extend the actual malice rule to any non-official plaintiffs.  Some
courts were willing to create such extensions, and the term “public
figure,” taken from privacy tort law, is one of several labels that
judges used to describe their experimental categories of “actual
malice” plaintiffs.  Judges also used other labels, including, “public
personage,” “public man,” “public person,” and “person in public
life.”9
When the Supreme Court fixed upon the public figure label
in Butts, in extending the protection of the First Amendment to
libels of some non-official plaintiffs, different groups of justices
offered two competing definitions of a public figure.10  Each group
used this label as a new First Amendment term of art to express
formulas designed to interpret the policies of Sullivan; the justices
differed as to how to explicate and enforce those policies.11  In ef-
fect, the justices treated the public figure label as
entertained serious doubts as to the truth” of  defamatory speech); Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc.  v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that plaintiff must prove both
actual malice and falsity of defamatory speech by clear and convincing evidence). See
also HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 97-111 (noting that Sullivan adopts a novel reckless disre-
gard definition of actual malice that is different from all existing common law defini-
tions); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 713 (1908) (defining common law actual
malice as not making “all reasonable effort to ascertain the facts before publishing the
same” and not acting “in good faith”). Compare 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 350
(observing that speech is defamatory when it has a “tendency to harm” the plaintiff’s
reputation in the “eyes of a substantial number of respectable people in the commu-
nity” in which the plaintiff lives) with PROSSER, supra note 2, at 758 (noting that defama-
tory epithets in pre-Sullivan case law include “a coward, a drunkard, a hypocrite, a liar, a
scoundrel, a crook, a scandal-monger, an anarchist, a skunk, a bastard, a eunuch, or a
‘rotten egg,’ [being] unfair to labor, or [doing] a thing which is oppressive or dishonor-
able or heartless”).
9. See infra note 194. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 392-98,
415 (1960) (describing pre-Sullivan public figure doctrine in privacy tort law).
10. See Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (Harlan, J., plurality) (citing Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc., 221 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y.), vacated, 387 U.S. 239 (1966), aff’d on reargu-
ment, 21 N.Y.2d 124 (1967) (referring to public figure definition in privacy law)). See
Butts, 388 U.S. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) (“[T]he seven members
of the Court who deem it necessary to pass upon the question agree that the [libel
plaintiffs] in these cases are ‘public figures’ for First Amendment purposes.”).
11. Justices Harlan’s plurality includes Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas; it rejects
the actual malice standard, arguing for the less demanding standard of liability for
“highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.” See
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an empty shell and filled it with original blends of competing
connotations derived from sources that included libel and privacy
privilege doctrines, the Court’s own precedents, and the experi-
mental jurisprudence of the lower courts.12  Soon after Butts, the
Court divided over whether to extend the actual malice rule to
speech about private figures in connection with matters of public
concern.13  Ultimately, the Court redefined the public figure
formula in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.14 by restricting the actual mal-
ice requirement to public officials and public figures.  The much-
Kalven, supra note 6, at 301 (characterizing the Harlan standard as one of “gross negli-
gence”).  Justices Brennan and White join in Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, support-
ing the actual malice standard; Brennan and White would have remanded for a new
trial in Butts because of a jury instruction error, but otherwise support Warrren’s rea-
soning. Justices Black and Douglas support absolute protection for libel defendants.
Thus, five justices implicitly support the actual malice standard as the minimum level of
privilege. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 155, 162, 170, 172.  Only Justice Harlan’s opinion, with
four votes, may be termed a “plurality opinion.”  As a technical matter, there can be
only one plurality opinion in any decision, which is why Chief Justice Warren’s opinion,
with three votes supporting most of its reasoning, is labeled a “concurrence.” See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (4th ed. 1996) (“Plurality Opinion [is] one agreed to by
less than a majority of the court but the result of which is agreed to by the majority.”).
12. See discussion of the tort privileges infra Part II.A.; discussion of post-Sullivan
precedents infra Part III.A.; discussion of lower court jurisprudence infra Part III.B.,
III.C.
13. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Compare id. at 52
(plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Blackmun, J.) (requiring a
private person to prove actual malice when libel involves matter of public concern),
with id. at 78-80 (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Stewart, J.) (advocating
negligence standard for private persons because actual malice requirement for public
concern speech will provide insufficient protection for reputation and dignity interests
of libel plaintiffs).
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  According to Gertz, a plaintiff may be designated a public
figure either “for all purposes” because of “pervasive fame or notoriety,” or for a “lim-
ited purpose” because of “voluntarily inject[ing] himself [or herself] or [being] drawn
into a particular public controversy” concerning “a limited range of issues.”  The Gertz
Court describes the all-purpose public figures as persons who occupy positions of “per-
suasive power and influence,” and limited-purpose public figures as persons who “thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved.”  Both types of public figures may “invite attention and
comment” and may “assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.”
Id. at 345, 351.  The Court also noted that “it may be possible for someone to become a
public figure through no purposeful action of his [or her] own, but the instances of
truly involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare.” Id. at 345.
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debated Gertz formula remains a central feature of defamation law
today.15
The Sullivan Court did not write upon a clean slate when it
chose to address the problem of accommodating the freedoms of
speech and the press within common law libel doctrine.16  The
need to protect those freedoms is the driving force behind the
evolution of tort privilege defenses, which include the “fair com-
ment” and “honest misstatement of fact” privileges in libel law and
the “public figure” and “newsworthiness” privileges for the tort of
“publicity.”17  From the outset, the Court has framed its constitu-
tional libel doctrine in the vernacular of tort law because a majority
of the Court is not prepared to create absolute First Amendment
protection from libel suits.18  As long as the machinery of libel liti-
gation is allowed to grind on, it is necessary to design constitutional
libel doctrines with a vocabulary and substantive content that will
mesh with the gears of that machinery.19  A study of the origins of
15. For criticisms of Gertz and public figure holdings, see, for example, David A.
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975); Frederick Schauer,
Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984); 1 SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 2.35, at 2-53-
2-56.1; § 2.35.50 at 2-56.3-2-56.17. See JONES, supra note 7, at 363-70 (providing bibliog-
raphy citing articles about Gertz and its progeny).
16. For scholars noting that the function of tort “privilege” defenses in libel and
privacy tort suits is to protect constitutional freedoms of speech and press, see, for ex-
ample, Kalven, supra note 6, at 290; Prosser, supra note 9, at 410; Hill, supra note 3, at
1255-56; William Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle:  A Forthcoming Newsworthiness
Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 UCLA L. REV. 371, 374 (1970).  For pre-Sullivan commentary
on free speech issues in libel and privacy law, see, for example, Marc A. Franklin, A
Constitutional Problem in Privacy Protection:  Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 107 (1963); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Law of Defamation and the First Amendment, in
CONFERENCE ON THE ARTS, PUBLISHING, AND THE LAW 3 (Univ. of Chicago Law School
Conference Series No. 10, 1952); Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candi-
dates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875 (1949).
17. In this article the term “publicity” tort is used for the action that Prosser calls
“public disclosure of private facts,” Dobbs calls “publicizing private life,” and Smolla
calls the “publication of private facts.” See Prosser, supra note 9, at 392; 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 425-428, at 1198-1211 (2001); 2 SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 10:37-
10:54.50 (1997-2004). See infra note 23 for other privacy torts.
18. Absolute immunity from libel suits for critics of public officials is advocated by
Justices Goldberg, Black, and Douglas in Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring,
joined by Douglas, J.); id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result, joined by Doug-
las, J.). See infra note 95.
19. For commentary on common law libel doctrine and Sullivan, see, for example,
Eaton, supra note 2, at 1351-64; Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware:  The Rejuvena-
tion of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 64-94, 48 n.230 (1983).
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the constitutional public figure concept in libel law reveals how tort
privileges may be reconfigured into new doctrines that exhibit
traces of the vocabulary and rationales that shaped their original
identities.  The Court’s doctrinal uses of tort law are sufficiently
unique and unpredictable that the era between Sullivan and Butts
provides rich case law and commentary devoted to the difficulties of
assessing the implications of those uses.20  Like the tort privileges
that preceded it, the “defeasible” First Amendment privilege,21 cre-
ated in Sullivan and its progeny, is based on “sociological guesses
lightly made.”22
In Part II.A. of this article, the privileges for the publicity tort
are compared to the libel privileges of fair comment and honest
misstatement of fact, in order to explain why the Sullivan Court
selected the latter privilege as a source for a new actual malice re-
quirement for public official plaintiffs.  Part II.B. describes how
some rationales in Sullivan are broad enough to justify absolute
First Amendment protection of libelous speech concerning public
officials, whereas the rationales explaining the merits of the actual
malice requirement are less well-developed.  The tension between
these two narratives leads to confusion among lower court judges as
to whether to interpret Sullivan to favor the extension of the actual
malice rule to libel suits by non-official plaintiffs.
20. See JONES, supra note 7, at 363-70 (providing bibliography citing articles about
Sullivan doctrine); ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 349-57 (same).  For notable period com-
mentary, see, for example, Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press – A New First Amendment
Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967); Arthur Berney, Libel and the First Amendment – A New
Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965); Cohen, supra note 16, at 371; Harry
Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case:  A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191; Willard H. Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel:
The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581 (1964).
21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 n.30 (1964). See infra Parts
III.B. & C. for case law.
22. Compare Kalven, supra note 6, at 299 (referring in context to Justice Harlan’s
Butts opinion, and criticizing Harlan’s assumed answers to empirical questions such as:
“How free and robust is [the] press?  How hardened are public officials to irresponsible
publicity?  Do they knowingly assume these risks?  What are the relative possibilities for
counterargument [by those officials or by so-called public figures]?”), with Richard A.
Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrongly Decided?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 817
(1986) (opining that “the great problem with [Sullivan] is that the choice of legal prin-
ciples rests heavily on certain elusive, empirical issues,” such as the “costs of error and
of administration,” “the incentives upon the press to investigate important matters of
public affairs,” and “the incentives for plaintiffs to participate in public affairs”).
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Part III of the article explains how the Court uses three post-
Sullivan decisions to articulate conflicting hints and signals that am-
biguously favor the extension of the actual malice requirement.  Af-
ter explaining how lower courts respond in contradictory ways to
these signals, Part III concludes with a discussion of how the pro-
extension courts apply the actual malice rule to cases where plain-
tiffs either play an active role as participants in public debates, or
use their leadership or influence to seek to shape public opinion.
These courts do not extend the actual malice rule to plaintiffs solely
on the basis of their status as public figures, as defined by the pub-
licity tort privilege, and some courts expressly reject arguments for
such an extension.
Part IV of the article explains how two templates for a new First
Amendment public figure privilege emerge in the Butts opinions.
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion emphasizes the need to extend the
actual malice requirement to those figures who resemble public of-
ficials in their powers of leadership and influence.  Justice Harlan
advocates a less protective gross negligence privilege, and applies it
to public figure plaintiffs who attract the interest of the public, yet
play no role in public debates.  Part IV.A. examines the defense of
the Sullivan narratives reflected in the Warren opinion’s public fig-
ure definition, and Part IV.B. describes the reworking of those nar-
ratives by the Harlan opinion.  Justice Harlan’s narratives
defending his rejection of the actual malice rule prove to be more
important than either his public figure definition or his gross negli-
gence standard.  Harlan’s narratives detach Sullivan’s rationales
from the actual malice rule they were designed to support, and re-
place them with alternate narratives that establish a legacy for the
Gertz Court. To this day, the public figure label remains an empty
shell, filled with a blend of connotations that serves the Court’s
continuing reinterpretations of the values protected by Sullivan.
II. THE TORT LAW CONTEXT OF THE SULLIVAN DECISION
A. Privacy and Libel Privileges in the Era Before Sullivan
The Sullivan opinions do not mention the term “public fig-
ure,” but by 1964 the public figure privilege is a well-established
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doctrine in privacy law for the publicity tort.23  The function of this
privilege is to protect the defendant whose true speech24 about “pri-
vate facts”25 is communicated to the public,26 is offensive to persons
of ordinary sensibilities,27 and causes emotional harm to the plain-
tiff.28  This privilege allows a defendant to avoid liability when a
plaintiff qualifies for public figure status; the status attaches to “any
one who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused
upon him as a person.”29  More specifically, this status applies to “a
person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by
adopting a profession or calling” gives the public a “legitimate in-
23. See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (the article widely credited as the impetus for the state court debate
that led to the adoption of the publicity tort in case law and statute).  Warren and
Brandeis were law school classmates and law partners.  Warren is said to have persuaded
Brandeis to write the article when Warren became upset by newspaper publicity con-
cerning his daughter’s wedding. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 383.  The purpose of their R
proposed publicity tort was to create liability for harms caused by true speech that
neither qualifies as libel nor meets the requirements of the privacy torts of “false light,”
“appropriation” of personality, or “intrusion” upon private life. See Prosser, supra note
9, at 387-409 (comparing the privacy torts).
24. Truth is not a defense to the publicity tort, which creates liability for true
speech.  False speech is an element of the libel tort and of the privacy tort of false light,
which creates liability for false, non-defamatory but embarrassing publicity that is objec-
tionable to the ordinary person.  Examples of false light cases include unauthorized use
in the mass media of a person’s name or picture, erroneous descriptions of a person, or
erroneous attributions of opinions or writings. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 838-39.
25. Compare Prosser, supra note 9, at 394 (explaining that “private facts” do not
include information that the plaintiff “leaves open to the public eye,” such as her ap-
pearance in a public place and matters of public record) with Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that truthful publication of matter contained in public
records is protected under First Amendment unless legal prohibition is “narrowly tai-
lored to a state interest of the highest order”).
26. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law:  Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 333 (1966).
27. Compare Prosser, supra note 9, at 396-97 (noting that liability will exist for giv-
ing publicity to things “which the customs and ordinary views of the community will not
tolerate”) with Kalven, supra note 26, at 334 (concluding that “[t]he upshot” of using a
mores test for the offensiveness standard is that “every unconsented-to reference in the
press creates prima facie a cause of action that could take the plaintiff to the jury”).
28. Compare Prosser, supra note 9, at 398 (“The interest protected is that of reputa-
tion, with the same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel.”) with Kalven,
supra note 26, at 334 (“Surely it is even more conjectural to price the emotional impact
of a truthful nondefamatory statement” than to assess the impact of libel.).
29. Prosser, supra note 9, at 411.
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terest in his doings, his affairs, and his character.”30  Various theo-
ries are invoked to justify the loss of privacy rights by a public
figure.  It is argued that a plaintiff’s “waiver” of privacy rights may
be inferred from her participation in activities that attract media
attention,31 and that no privacy loss is suffered from additional pub-
licity about a person whose affairs are “already public.”32  The privi-
lege also is justified as a means of insuring press freedom to “inform
the public about those who have become legitimate matters of pub-
lic interest.”33
A closely related privilege arises for defendants in publicity
cases, when plaintiffs effectively become “public figures for a sea-
son,”34 even though they are not public figures generally, and do
not seek publicity voluntarily.  If a plaintiff comes to be caught up
in the news, defined broadly to include “that indefinable quality of
information which arouses public attention,”35 then a “newsworthi-
ness” privilege of “giving publicity to news and other matters of
public interest” will defeat liability.36  The newsworthiness and pub-
30. Prosser, supra note 2, at 844-45. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 410-11 (providing
case law examples of public figures that include actors, sports figures, entertainers, pub-
lic officers, inventors, explorers, and war heroes).
31. Prosser, supra note 9, at 410-11; Franklin, supra note 16, at 109 n.16.
32. Prosser, supra note 9, at 411.  Three aspects of the public figure privilege for
the publicity tort prefigure the Gertz definition of the First Amendment privilege.  First,
the tort privilege provides a defense to “additional publicity, as to matters reasonably
within the scope of the public interest which [the public figure] has aroused.” Id. at
411-12.  Second, a defendant’s publicity cannot create public figure status for a plaintiff
because “public stature must already exist before there can be any privilege arising out
of it. . .” Id. at 411.  Third, a public figure may be characterized as a “celebrity,” who by
his “voluntary” efforts has “succeeded in placing himself in the public eye.” Id. at 410.
See also supra note 14 (summarizing the Gertz Court’s definition of public figure).
33. Prosser, supra note 9, at 411.
34. Id. at 413.  The newsworthiness privilege’s role in changing the status of non-
public figures into “involuntary” public figures echoes elements of the “limited public
figure” concept in Gertz. See also supra note 14.
35. Prosser, supra note 9, at 412. Compare Cohen, supra note 16, at 380 (explain-
ing that Warren and Brandeis “conceded a privilege to print news,” but assumed that
distinctions could be drawn “between protected ‘matter which is of public or general
interest’ and [publicity about] trivial events or gossip” that would establish liability for
the publicity tort) with Kalven, supra note 26, at 335-36 (observing that “since Warren
and Brandeis wrote, it has been agreed that there is a generous privilege to serve the
public interest in news” and so it may be that “the claim of privilege is [so] overpower-
ing as to swallow the tort”).
36. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 844. See also Franklin, supra note 16, at 115 (noting
that “courts appear willing to accept most professional definitions of ‘news’” and that
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lic figure privileges are “so merged as to become inseparable,” even
though, technically speaking, the public figure privilege protects
publicity about a person and the newsworthiness privilege protects
the reporting of an event.37  Both privileges protect true speech
that appeals to the public interest,38 and proof of a defendant’s ill
will or actual malice will not defeat these defenses.39
Before the Sullivan decision, it does not appear that the public
figure privilege migrated into defamation law, in which the older
privileges of fair comment40 and honest misstatements of fact41 are
embedded.  The public figure term does not appear in connection
with libel law analysis in well-known treatises of the day42 and ap-
pears infrequently in case reports involving libel claims.43  Even
when the term is mentioned in a libel case, the reference does not
mean that the defendant invoked the public figure privilege.44
Doctrinal reasons explain why the publicity privileges are incompat-
ible with the libel privilege of fair comment, which is “grudgingly
granted” and “narrowly construed.”45  In the pre-Sullivan era, some
“once an event is determined to be news the individuals involved are inevitably subject
to coverage”).
37. Compare Prosser, supra note 9, at 413 n.254 and PROSSER, supra note 2, at 844,
with Kalven, supra note 6, at 280 (merging the two publicity privileges by describing
them as a privilege in privacy tort for “newsworthy events or people”).
38. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 380 n.46 (observing that the publicity privileges
have been “so greatly expanded that few of the cases allowing recovery on a privacy
theory rest upon mass media disclosure of true facts” and citing supporting cases whose
holdings are obsolete because of modern precedents). See supra note 25.
39. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d. 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (noting that
truthful, non-libelous publicity, even if malicious, does not create liability for privacy
tort).
40. See generally PROSSER, supra note 2, at 812-16; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2,
at 456-63.
41. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 815; 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 449-50.
42. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938); PROSSER, supra note 2, at 812-16;
1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 456-64.
43. A Lexis search for libel cases before 1964 yields few cases where the term pub-
lic figure appears in the same opinion as the word libel. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Nicholson
Publ’g Co., 137 La. 588 (1915), cited in Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., plurality).
44. See Flanagan, 137 La. at 600 (where the court’s analysis rests on the fair com-
ment privilege). See also Prosser, supra note 9, at 415-16 (emphasizing that the public
figure and newsworthiness privileges apply only to the publicity tort, so “that either the
public figure or the man in the news can maintain an action” for the other three pri-
vacy torts).
45. Cohen, supra note 16, at 375. See infra text accompanying notes 49-55.
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courts seek to expand the narrow boundaries of the latter privilege
in order to protect misstatements of fact about public officials.  The
actual malice component of this privilege becomes a source for the
First Amendment privilege established in Sullivan.  In turn, Butts
implants the public figure label, though not the public figure privi-
lege, into Sullivan’s doctrine, and thereby into defamation law.
Compared to the publicity tort privileges, the fair comment
privilege for libel is narrower and more complex.46   One premise
for the latter privilege is that the expression of opinion relating to
matters of “public concern” should be protected in a “democratic
society that enjoys the tradition of free speech.”47  This idiom of
public concern echoes the public interest48 element of the publicity
privileges, but the fair comment privilege displays a unique doctri-
nal framework that revolves around a definition of protected “opin-
ion.”   Liability for libel may attach to a statement of opinion as well
as a statement of fact,49 and only an opinion that can satisfy numer-
ous technical requirements may qualify as privileged comment.
More specifically, protected opinion must be based only “upon a
true or privileged statement of fact.”50  The opinion must not di-
rectly (but only indirectly)51 imply “facts truly stated or otherwise
known” or “readily accessible.”52 The opinion must be susceptible
46. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 795-812 (providing illustrations of other libel priv-
ileges not relevant here).
47. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 456. See also Noel, supra note 16, at 877
(arguing that the fair comment privilege is meant to encourage “free public discussion”
as a “means of combating abuses and corrupting influences, and of aiding the public to
form a sound judgment on matters of public interest”).
48. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 2, at 812, 844-45 (using the terms public concern
and public interest interchangeably in fair comment analysis and using the term public
interest more consistently in analysis of publicity privileges).
49. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 (1938) (providing that “[a] defamatory com-
munication may consist of a statement of opinion based upon facts known or assumed
by both parties to the communication”).  The concept of a false opinion is recognized
in English libel law.  The original benefit of the fair comment privilege is to allow a
defendant to escape liability when his or her opinion is not based on a false fact and is
honestly held.  Without the fair comment privilege as a defense, a defendant’s avoid-
ance of liability would require proof of the truth of a factual statement, or proof of the
correctness of an opinion. See HARRY STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 312-13, 332 (1963).
50. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 456.
51. See id. at 458.
52. See id. at 458-59. See Herbert W. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opin-
ion — A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1203 (1962) (criticizing the
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“of being drawn from the implied or known facts”53 and must be
uttered by the speaker as her “actual honest opinion” for “the pur-
pose of giving to the public the benefit of the opinion.”54  Finally,
even if a defamatory opinion satisfies all these requirements, the
plaintiff’s proof of actual malice, defined as negligence, will defeat
this libel defense.55  Notably, the fair comment privilege does not
effectively protect speech that occupies the domain of libel.  That
domain encompasses false and defamatory speech56 and the fair
comment privilege only provides an elaborate and restricted de-
fense of truth.57  By contrast, the publicity privileges protect all true
information in the public interest.  This speech domain falls
squarely within a large part of the territory of actionable speech for
the publicity tort.
The honest misstatement of fact privilege develops when some
courts decide to stretch the boundaries of the fair comment privi-
lege beyond the zone of “opinion based on true fact” into the realm
of “false statements of fact.”58  The refusal of most courts to protect
that realm under the fair comment privilege is justified originally by
the concern that “desirable candidates” would be “deterred from
seeking office” if they were subjected to criticisms containing mis-
representations of fact.59  This rationale is expanded later to justify
the inapplicability of the fair comment privilege to other misstate-
ments of fact.60  As early as the 1840s, some scholars argue that a
“conditional privilege” should be created for libelous statements of
fact about public officials or political candidates, in the absence of a
opinion requirements); Noel, supra note 16, at 877-88 (discussing the fair comment
defense).
53. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 460.
54. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 cmt. d (1938).
55. See Cohen, supra note 16, at 375 (“[T]he plaintiff could avoid an unfavorable
summary judgment or directed verdict with evidence of malice, in the sense of either
negligence or ill will.”).
56. See 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 350; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 758.
57. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 16 (explaining the
history of the truth defense). See also STREET, supra note 49, at 312-13, 332.
58. Each reference to “false statements of fact” in the text is meant to include
“opinions based on false statements of fact,” and other opinions that do not qualify for
the definition of “opinion” protected by the fair comment privilege.  These false state-
ments and “false opinions” are necessarily defamatory.
59. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 814.
60. Id.
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plaintiff’s showing of actual malice.61  The new privilege also be-
comes known as the privilege for honest misstatement of fact, and it
attracts a following among a minority of state courts.62  The mem-
bers of the American Law Institute debate the desirability of adopt-
ing this privilege when drafting the first Restatement of Torts.  But
they reject this course of action when the opponents of the reform
argue that it is a “revolutionary,” “dangerous and unwarranted de-
parture from the whole doctrine of libel,” and that it would give the
press “unbridled license” to defame public officials and
candidates.63
Both the fair comment and honest misstatement of fact privi-
leges protect only speech that relates to a matter of public con-
cern.64  That concept is defined through two overlapping branches
of doctrine, one of which relates to the plaintiff’s status and the
other to the plaintiff’s conduct.65  Under the status branch, opin-
ions about individuals are deemed to relate to the public concern if
the person is a public official, a candidate for public office, or a
61. See ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 160-61 & n. 19.  One famous proponent of this
new privilege was Judge Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court, author of
treatises on constitutional law and torts. Id. at 168-69, citing THOMAS COOLEY, TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 217 (1879). See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280 n.20 (citing Cooley’s
1903 constitutional law treatise).
62. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 729-32 (1908). Compare Berney,
supra note 20, at 8 (declaring that the Coleman opinion “raised and considered almost
every argument that has ever been mustered for or against liberalization” of the fair
comment privilege but “[n]otwithstanding [its] sound analysis,” Coleman’s adoption of
the actual malice rule garnered “only a meager following”), with HOPKINS, supra note 7,
at 76 (arguing that a “careful examination of case law” reveals that in 1964, the “so-
called minority position [of Coleman] was not a minority position at all”; the Coleman
rule was adopted by more states than rejected it, and the miscount by scholars and
judges of the states supporting Coleman occurred because of “changes in the law that
were not reflected in the literature”).
63. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 219-20.  The A.L.I. defeated the reform proposal
in May 1937 by a vote of 98-22, with Judges Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, and Van
Vechten Veeder opposing the new privilege, and torts professors John Hallen of Texas
and Fowler Harper of Yale supporting it, along with Judge Rousseau Burch, the author
of Coleman. Contra John E. Hallen, Fair Comment, 8 TEX. L. REV. 41, 72 (1929) (predict-
ing that the new privilege “will probably become, in time, the prevailing view in this
country”).
64. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 812.
65. These two categories overlap when members of the status category, such as
public officials, engage in conduct that qualifies them for the second category.
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person in charge of a public institution.66  The privileges cover “the
public acts of a public man,”67 using the rationale that, as one
catchphrase puts it, public men are “public property.”68  Under the
conduct branch of the doctrine, opinions are privileged if they re-
late to works that the plaintiff submits to the public for approval.69
Similarly, if a plaintiff submits his ideas to the public through the
“taking [of] a belligerent or controversial position,” thereby invit-
ing public controversy, then a defendant’s opinion about those
ideas or positions also qualifies as privileged.70  Like public men
who become public property through the fiction of implied consent
to fair comment, a plaintiff’s public works and positions may also
undergo this transformation.71
The vocabulary, definitions, and rationales of the libel privi-
leges intersect and overlap with those of the publicity tort privi-
leges, even though the libel privileges neither create a right “to
comment on matters merely because they [are] of news value,”72
nor protect comments about all persons who are public figures by
virtue of being the object of public attention.73  The categories of
public men and public figures overlap because the activities of
plaintiffs in the public men category can make them objects of pub-
lic interest, thereby creating public figure status.  Similarly, the pro-
fessions of entertainers or sports figures require them to submit
their performances for public comment, thus establishing the fame
66. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 456-67. See Developments in the Law of Defa-
mation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 925-26 (1956) (noting that “usually [fair] comment con-
cerns public officers, political candidates, leaders of influential private groups, and
persons who have taken a public position on matters of wide interest”).
67. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 461. See also Coleman, 78 Kan. at 736 (citing
Post Publ’g Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (1893), citing Davis v. Shepstone, 11 App. Cas.
187 (P.C. 1886)).
68. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 461. See ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 169
(citing THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 455-56 n.4
(1868) (referring to the public man concept)).
69. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 813-14 (providing examples that include literary
and artistic works, musical or theatrical performances, television and radio programs,
sports events and other entertainment, and scientific discoveries).
70. Id. at 814.
71. 1 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 2, at 457.
72. Cohen, supra note 16, at 375. See Franklin, supra note 16, at 112 n.29.
73. See Prosser, supra note 9, at 411-12.
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necessary to create public figure status based on their calling.74  An-
other intersection of the libel and publicity privileges is reflected in
the similarity of the rationales used to justify them.  For example,
public figure plaintiffs lose the right to bring a publicity suit be-
cause of voluntary or involuntary exposure of their activities that
attract media attention.  Similarly, the plaintiff class composed of
public men, entertainers, and participants in public controversies,
loses the right to sue for libel when subjected to privileged opin-
ions; by exposing works or ideas to the public, they subject them-
selves to the consequences of public scrutiny and criticism.  The
fictional character of the four privileges’ rationales makes it easy to
transfer each rationale from one privilege to another.75  Although
the publicity and libel privileges are different in scope and effect,
they share enough common ground to allow for the potential inter-
mingling of their vocabulary and rationales.
In theory, the honest misstatement of fact privilege applies to
the same categories of public concern speech as the fair comment
privilege.76  But in practice, it appears that among the courts that
recognize the new privilege, few courts extend the actual malice
requirement beyond cases where the plaintiff is a public official or
candidate.77  Thus, on the eve of Sullivan, only limited inroads have
74. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 29-30.
75. For example, Restatement commentary describing the rationale for the pub-
licity tort echoes the language of the rationales for the fair comment privilege in libel.
Under Section 867, the Restatement creates liability for the publicity tort for a “person
who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another’s interest in not having his af-
fairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the [public].”  The relevant commen-
tary explains that if a person “submits himself or his work for public approval, as does a
candidate for public office, a public official, an actor, an author or a stunt aviator,” he
or she “must necessarily pay the price of even unwelcome publicity through reports
upon his private life” because he or she is “subject to the privileges which publishers
have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to their leaders, heroes, villains and victims.”
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 42, § 867 cmt. c (1938).
76. See, e.g., Coleman, 78 Kan. 711, 732 (1908) (observing that the honest misstate-
ment of fact privilege “must apply to all officers and agents of government [and] to the
management of all public institutions, educational, charitable, and penal; the conduct
of all corporate enterprises affected with a public interest, transportation, banking, in-
surance; and to innumerable other subjects involving the public welfare”).
77. See Case Comment, Constitutional Law — First Amendment Requires Qualified Priv-
ilege to Punish Defamatory Misstatements about Public Officials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 284, 289 &
289 n.36 (1964) (citing cases from four jurisdictions with non-official plaintiffs where
Coleman rule is used, and dicta from two others). But see Samuel Gray McNamara, Note,
Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional Limitations on State Defamation Laws, 18
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been made into the domain of libel through the use of the honest
misstatement of fact privilege to protect false and defamatory
speech.  In time, this privilege might have grown to create a larger
field of protection for libelous speech, by moving into the catego-
ries of libels about public men and persons who submit their works
or ideas to the public.
But the potential evolution of the honest misstatement of fact
privilege is interrupted by the surprising event of the Sullivan deci-
sion, which endorses a modified version of that privilege as First
Amendment doctrine.  The “nationalizing” effect of the new privi-
lege raises the question whether the public concern concept for the
libel privileges will be adopted as the compass for the First Amend-
ment privilege.  If not, then an alternate compass could be con-
structed out of other tort privileges.  Before Sullivan, the public
figure category overlaps with the category of persons whose status
or activities make them subject to the fair comment privilege.78 Af-
ter Sullivan, the courts must find vocabulary and doctrines to define
the scope and meaning of the Sullivan privilege, and the public fig-
ure concept exhibits a number of assets that make it useful for such
purposes.
First, the public figure concept is not weighed down with doc-
trinal baggage in the arena of common law libel that could inter-
fere with its use as part of the machinery of the constitutional
privilege.  Second, its definition as a publicity privilege is so broad
that a narrower constitutional definition may be invented without
disturbing its broad original meaning.  Third, the public figure la-
bel possesses a rhetorical resonance with the public man label, in
VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (1965) (noting that honest misstatement of fact privilege “is
restricted to criticism of government or public officials”).
78. 376 U. S. at 269.  After Sullivan, some commentators note that the libel privi-
lege of fair comment was applicable to cases involving public figures. See, e.g., Kalven,
supra note 6, at 290-91 (observing that “[f]air comment [doctrine may rely on] differ-
ences between comment by way of literary criticism and comment on public officials,
candidates for office, or other public figures”); Robert A. Melin,  Note, Torts: Trial Court
Difficulties in Applying the New Rule of Fair Mistake to Civil Libel, 48 MARQUETTE L. REV. 128,
133 n.34 (1964) (“It is universally agreed that the rule of fair comment applies to public
figures, not simply political figures.”); McNamara, supra note 77, at 1436 (noting that
fair comment doctrine uses the public figure concept).  These commentators do not
explain the function of the public figure concept in fair comment doctrine, but it is
evident that the fair comment plaintiff categories overlap with the public figure cate-
gory. See supra text accompanying note 74.
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the same way that the public interest and public concern labels ap-
pear to be related.  Finally, the public figure privilege is associated
with rationales for the loss of privacy rights that resemble the ratio-
nales of the libel privileges.79  When the constitutional public figure
privilege makes its first appearance in Butts, the story of the official
migration of the public figure concept from privacy law into libel
law begins to unfold.  The potential directions of that unfolding
may be discerned through a study of Sullivan and its progeny, and
of the pre-Butts decisions of lower court judges who attempted to
read the tea leaves of the Supreme Court’s opinions.
B. The Construction of a First Amendment “Privilege in Progress”
in Sullivan
When the Sullivan Court announces that libel has no “talis-
manic immunity” from First Amendment scrutiny,80 its endorse-
ment of an actual malice requirement for libels concerning the
public conduct of public officials instantly establishes a national law
of libel.81  Contemporary observers recognize that Sullivan is a
landmark civil rights case,82 and some express pleasure as well as
79. See supra note 75 and text accompanying notes 31-38, 66-71, 73-75.
80. See LEWIS, supra note 7, at 124 (explaining that First Amendment scrutiny is a
dramatic development because “the Supreme Court had said many times that libel was
outside the protection of the First Amendment”).  Professor Herbert Wechsler of Co-
lumbia Law School authors the brief and argues the case for the Times.  Wechsler per-
suaded the Times executives to challenge the verdict on First Amendment grounds
because, “if the Times didn’t make this argument, in what was overall a very sympathetic
case, who could be expected to make it?,” and because “the scope of the First Amend-
ment had been progressively expanded by the Supreme Court in recent years,” so that
almost “every one of the old shibboleths” about unprotected speech had been aban-
doned. Id. at 107.
81. See cases cited supra note 8. See also Pedrick, supra note 20, at 586, 587 (observ-
ing that because of Sullivan “the law of libel . . . has been nationalized to a considerable
if somewhat uncertain extent”); Harry Kalven, Jr., A WORTHY TRADITION:  FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA 68 (1988) (noting that after Sullivan, “the Court has been forced to
rewrite and federalize a considerable part of the state common law of libel”).
82. See Kalven, supra note 20, at 200 (“Alabama somehow pounced on [the] op-
portunity to punish the Times for its role in supporting the civil rights movement in the
South.”). See also William O. Bertelsman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A.J. 657, 660
(1966); Lewis C. Green, The New York Times Rule: Judicial Overkill, 12 VILL. L. REV. 730,
734 (1967); Pedrick, supra note 20, at 588; Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., The Anatomy of a His-
toric Decision: New York Times v. Sullivan, 43 N. C. L. REV. 315 (1965); Michael A.
Macchiaroli, Note, Libel — Public Official — Recovery for Libel of a Public Official Requires
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surprise at the decision,83 while others express fear that the actual
malice rule provides too much protection for libelous criticism of
officials.84  It is apparent that the complexities of the Sullivan opin-
ion create ambiguities concerning the scope of its holding and its
implications.  At the center of this ambiguity is the tension created
by the Court’s endorsement of rationales that are broad enough to
justify absolute First Amendment protection for libels of public offi-
cials, coupled with the articulation of narrower rationales that limit
such protection to libels made without actual malice.85  Other
Proof of Actual Malice, 9 VILL. L. REV. 534, 539 (1964); Note, The Supreme Court, 1963
Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 204 (1964).
83. See, e.g., Pedrick, supra note 20, at 587 (“To argue . . . that the established
majority common-law rule, sanctioned by the Restatement of Torts, the law of England,
and the countries of the Commonwealth, was an abridgement of . . .  the  first amend-
ment called for a certain temerity, a certain boldness of spirit [in which counsel for the
Times] . . . succeeded brilliantly.”); Kalven, supra note 20, at 221 n.125 (opining that
Sullivan is “an occasion for dancing in the streets”).
84. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 20, at 1657 (arguing that Sullivan will “serve to
equip the press with some new and rather heavy artillery which can crush as well as
stimulate debate”);  Berney, supra note 20, at 57 (“If defamation of public officials was a
major weapon in the rise to power of the Nazis, what is to redress the balance after
[Sullivan] should reactionary groups gain control of a significant segment of the
press?”); Green, supra note 83, at 731; Shelmerdeane Miller, Note, Constitutional Law
Law — Freedom of Press — Misstatement of Fact Held Privileged in Libel Action by Public Offi-
cial, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 181, 183-84 (1964); Michael J. Rubin, Note, Torts — Defamation
— Constitutional Requirement of Actual Malice — New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 14 AM.
U. L. REV. 71, 74 (1964).
85. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281-83 & 292 n.30 (citing Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan.
711 (1908)). See cases cited supra note 8.  The Sullivan Court held that the plaintiff’s
evidence did not satisfy the actual malice standard.  Police Commissioner Sullivan of
Montgomery, Alabama, sued the Times for libel because of a full-page advertisement
entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices, which describes the treatment of Dr. Martin Luther
King and student protestors in Montgomery by “police,” “state authorities,” and “South-
ern violators.”  The ad appeals for support of the Committee to Defend Martin Luther
King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South, and lists the names of over 80 people
as supporters. Id. at 257-58.  The plaintiff joined four named ministers with the Times as
defendants, presumably to create diversity jurisdiction.  Barry Mason, Comment, Defa-
mation of Public Officials — Free Speech — the Constitutional Standard, 12 UCLA L. REV.
1420, 1422 n.15 (1965).  The ad contains false statements of fact, which the Court char-
acterizes as minor, in finding that it was reasonable for the Times staff to think that the
ad was “substantially correct.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286.  The Court reverses Sullivan’s
judgment of $500,000, holding that the failure of the Times to check the accuracy of the
ad’s statements did not constitute actual malice, and reverses the same judgment
against the ministers for lack of actual malice evidence. See id. at 287-88.  The Court
also reverses the judgment against the Times because the statements in the ad are not
“of and concerning” Sullivan, who is not named in the ad, thereby establishing a First
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sources of ambiguity include the Court’s revision of the actual mal-
ice definition used for the honest misstatement of fact privilege,
and its silence concerning the relevance of other elements of that
privilege to First Amendment analysis.86  After Sullivan, the Court’s
new actual malice doctrine could be called a privilege in progress,
and its rationales appear to be moving targets.
One of Sullivan’s prominent rationales relies on the theory
that the Sedition Act of 179887  violated the First Amendment, as
recognized “in the court of history,”88 and that therefore, as one
scholar put it, “defamation of the government is an impossible no-
tion for a democracy.”89  This rationale supports constitutional
scrutiny of legal restraints upon “criticism of government and pub-
lic officials,” including scrutiny of criminal and civil liability rules
for libel.90  A “free debate” narrative further explains the need for
First Amendment protection for such libels, and includes a cluster
of rationales: effective “debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust and wide-open,”91 erroneous statement is “inevitable in
Amendment requirement that a false statement must refer to the plaintiff as an individ-
ual, and not merely to unspecified government employees whom the plaintiff super-
vises. Id. at 283-84, 291-92.
86. See cases cited supra note 8; supra note 79.
87. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 273-74 (describing how the Act made it a crime to
“write, utter, or publish” any “false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against
the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress [or] the Presi-
dent [with] intent to defame [or] to bring [them] into contempt or disrepute; or to
excite against them [the] hatred of the good people of the United States”).
88. Id. at 275. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 115-18 (noting the “boldness” of Wechs-
ler’s strategy in making this argument because “in 1963 hardly anyone was familiar with
the history of the Sedition Act [and] the constitutional-law texts of the time drew no
lessons from that episode for the meaning of the First Amendment”); Kalven, supra
note 20, at 207 (“[F]or over 150 years it was not thought necessary to establish the status
of the [Sedition] Act as a first step in getting to the meaning of the First
Amendment.”).
89. Kalven, supra note 20, at 205. See ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 241 (crediting
Kalven’s article, supra note 16, with identifying issues that would be addressed in Sulli-
van, such as the constitutionality of the Sedition Act of 1798 and the chilling effect of
defamation laws).
90. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 276.
91. 376 U.S. at 271.  The term “free debate” narrative is the author’s, as are other
labels for clusters of rationales that form a narrative discussed in the text.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR107.txt unknown Seq: 20 20-FEB-06 12:22
100 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
free debate,”92 and the fear of “virtually unlimited” libel judgments
for erroneous statements creates the chill of “self-censorship” that
“dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.”93
These rationales explain why the truth defense for libel provides
inadequate First Amendment protection by creating a form of strict
liability through the requirement that a “critic of official conduct”
must “guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions.”94  Yet these
rationales also could be used to support absolute First Amendment
protection for libels of government officials, as advocated by the
concurring justices.95  Moreover, the Court’s free debate narrative
does not explain why its new reckless disregard definition of actual
malice is superior to a negligence definition.96  Implicitly, the Court
92. Id. at 271-72 (declaring that erroneous statement “must be protected [if] free-
doms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive’” (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422 (1963)).
93. Id. at 279 (“[C]ritics may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even
though [it] is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court for fear of
the expense of having to do so.”); id. at 277-78 (declaring that chilling effect of civil
libel is “markedly greater” than that of criminal prosecutions, especially where a succes-
sion of costly judgments is threatened). See Lewis, supra note 7, at 161 (revealing that
Sullivan’s lawyer later observed that it was hard to win in the Supreme Court because of
“the amount of the verdict [and] the proliferation of contemporaneous lawsuits
brought by others”). See also Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278 n.18 (observing that the verdict
for $500,000 for Sullivan was followed by an identical verdict for another plaintiff); id.
at 294 (noting that eleven libel suits are pending in Alabama by state and local officials
against the Times seeking $5.6 million dollars).
94. Id. at 279.  The Sullivan Court invalidated the Alabama rule that “general dam-
ages” could be presumed.  Before Sullivan, defamation has a history of strict liability,
which “long antedated the development of general negligence law.”  2 DOBBS, supra
note 17, § 401, at 1119.  Defamation law is never “assimilated in nineteenth century tort
theory and keyed to liability limited to negligence,” and so “[t]he great role of the
common-law privileges in defamation is to abate the harshness of the strict liability prin-
ciple . . . .”  Kalven, supra note 6, at 291.
95. See Lewis, supra note 7, at 146-47 (observing that Justice Brennan’s majority
“opinion seemed to be heading [toward] absolute immunity for criticism of officials”
but then “suddenly” turned and adopted the actual malice rule instead).  For criticisms
of the absolute immunity argument, see, for example, Pedrick, supra note 20, at 596
(fearing that “[f]abricated charges of embezzlement of public funds, of bribery, of espi-
onage for a foreign power, could be made freely and without legal accountability”);
McNamara, supra note 77, at 1455 (opining that the public official who “assumes the
cloak of office [should] not forfeit his right to some recourse against the malicious
lie”). But see Berney, supra note 20, at 48-57 (defending absolute immunity).
96. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 741 (1908) (actual malice defined as
negligence); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (actual malice defined as reckless disregard).
See cases cited supra note 8.
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makes a sociological guess that the negligence standard would ex-
cessively chill robust debate.  Explicitly, the Court finds it necessary
to enhance the anti-chill properties of the actual malice rule by im-
posing the safeguards of the “convincing clarity” evidence stan-
dard97 and de novo appellate review of plaintiffs’ libel judgments.98
The Court relies on other rationales to construct a narrower
defense of the actual malice rule, pointing to the rule’s support by
“scholarly consensus,”99 and its resemblance to the “guilty knowl-
edge” mens rea requirement for criminal prosecutions of the sale
of obscenity.100  One possible explanation for the brevity of this ac-
tual malice narrative is that counsel for the New York Times argued
at length for absolute immunity, noting only briefly that the actual
malice rule would protect the press better than the strict liability
rules of Alabama defamation law.101  This fall back argument identi-
fies a tort idiom that becomes an enduring constitutional corner-
stone, even though the Court’s subsequent narratives concerning
that idiom evolve in ways that are not prefigured in the Sullivan
opinion.102
Any attempt to summarize the rationales in the Sullivan opin-
ion cannot do justice to them.103  The accordion-like quality of its
narratives is exposed by the intellectual distance between the
Court’s position that “seditious libel cannot be made the subject of
government sanction,”104 and the Court’s implicit invitation to ex-
97. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
30 (1971) (interpreting the “convincing clarity” standard as a “clear and convincing
evidence” standard).
98. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235
(1963)).
99. Id. at 280 n.20 (citing cases from ten states, four law review articles, and two
treatises).
100. Id. at 278-79 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1959)).
101. See Brief for Petitioner Times at 54, New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (citing Coleman, 78 Kan. 711).
102. See infra Parts III.A., IV.B.
103. See Sullivan, 376 U. S. at 265-92.  The effort of lower courts and commentators
to interpret the rationales of Sullivan is complicated by the Court’s reliance on over 30
First Amendment opinions from many fields, and on sources as varied as the history of
the Sedition Act of 1798, the writings of John Stuart Mill, John Milton, and Justice
Brandeis, numerous state libel precedents, the doctrine of official immunities, and vari-
ous articles and treatises.  The free debate narrative and the actual malice narrative are
only two of many that may be identified.
104. Kalven, supra note 20, at 208.
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tend the First Amendment protection to libels relating “to matters
in the public domain.”105  The clarity of this invitation is blurred by
doctrinal threads that create a special tie between the actual malice
requirement and public official plaintiffs.  For example, the Court
observes that it is fair to impose this requirement upon such plain-
tiffs because of the immunities they enjoy as defendants when sued
for their own libels.106  The same special tie is exhibited in the
Court’s argument that public officials should be inured to criticism
as “men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.”107  Yet a
broader scope for the new actual malice rule is suggested by the
Court’s references to the public concern concept, and to its cover-
age of speech about public men, as the root of the honest misstate-
ment of fact privilege.108  The broad scope of the fair comment
privilege is also referenced in the Court’s comment that “public
men are, as it were, public property.”109
The Court’s most noticeable silence in Sullivan concerns the
definition of the types of public officials and official conduct that
will be subject to the actual malice standard.110   This silence makes
105. Id. at 221. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1965) (citing Kalven ap-
provingly for these assessments of Brennan’s Sullivan opinion). See ROSENBERG, supra
note 7, at 241-42 (noting that Kalven “sought to reintroduce lawyers to the legacy of
Coleman” and foreshadowed Sullivan’s reliance on that non-mainstream defamation tra-
dition (citing Kalven, supra note 6)).
106. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282 (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)).
107. Id. at 273 (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947)).
108. Id. at 281-82 (observing that the privilege “extends to a great variety of subjects
and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office” (citing
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723 (1908)).  The only Coleman rationale cited in
Sullivan is the argument that the social benefit of discussions of the “character and
qualifications” of candidates for office outweighs the “occasional injury to the reputa-
tions of individuals,” which must “yield to the public welfare.” Id.
109. Id. at 268.
110. LEWIS, supra note 7, at 172 (explaining that Justice Brennan’s papers reveal
that footnote 23 was included because Justice Harlan asked Brennan to add a footnote
“to the effect that we are not called upon to delineate at this stage how far down the
line of public officials this new constitutional doctrine would reach,” because “I would
not want to foreclose a cop, a clerk, or some other minor public official from ordinary
libel suits without a great deal more thought”).  The public official and official conduct
concepts receive definitions in post-Sullivan precedents. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 77 (1964); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85-86 (1966).  Over time, the public
official label is applied to officials and candidates for “the most obscure office for which
a public election is prescribed.” JONES, supra note 7, at 39. See 1 SMOLLA, supra note 4,
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it difficult to determine which non-official plaintiffs covered by the
libel privileges may be covered by the Sullivan privilege in a future
case.111  Another notable silence appears in one of Sullivan’s most
famous passages, which articulates the principles that “debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open” and
“that [such debate] may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials.”112  The question unanswered by these linked images of
debate is whether robust debate on public issues will require First
Amendment protection for libels of non-official plaintiffs.  Possible
answers to that question leak out in a steady stream of speculative
dicta in three Supreme Court decisions during the pre-Butts era.
Those decisions also bring new narratives into discussions of the
actual malice rule.  Thinly veiled hints in these decisions maintain a
sense of suspense about the future scope of the Sullivan doctrine,
by continually injecting contradictory signals into the prevailing
trend of comments favoring expansion of the actual malice rule.
III. THE ROAD FROM SULLIVAN TO BUTTS:  THE ACTUAL MALICE
RULE AND NON-OFFICIAL PLAINTIFFS
A. Supreme Court Hints after Sullivan about Future Directions for
the Actual Malice Rule
During the three years between Sullivan and Butts, the Court
uses its libel decisions concerning public official plaintiffs to plant
hints about the possible future extension of the actual malice stan-
dard to suits involving non-official plaintiffs.113  Some of these hints
appear as cryptic footnote references that stand out because they
are only tangentially related to the issue under consideration.  Usu-
ally they are accompanied by the caveat that the Court does not
intend to intimate any view about a particular question.  One exam-
§ 2:100, at 2-122.1 (noting that there are “relatively few examples of government-related
defamation plaintiffs who are held not to be public officials” and usually these plaintiffs
have only “a peripheral or transient connection to governmental activity, or are ex-
tremely low in the organizational hierarchy”).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
112. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271. See infra note 171.
113. These hints are planted in opinions authored by Justice Brennan. See Garrison,
379 U.S. 64; Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 75; Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 372 (1967).
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ple appears in Garrison v. Louisiana,114 where the Court applies the
actual malice requirement to a criminal prosecution for libel of
public officials, noting that, “different interests may be involved
where purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are
concerned.”115  This observation may imply that the actual malice
rule should be applied to speech about public affairs, but not to
speech about other issues.116  Or, it may be an ambiguous musing
that provides little guidance about the future direction of the Sulli-
van doctrine.117  A more important type of hint in the Court’s pre-
Butts opinions takes the form of new rationales that supplement or
alter Sullivan’s narratives.  These additional rationales provide am-
munition for lower courts on both sides of the extension debate.
The Garrison opinion marks the moment when the Court’s first
allusion to the public figure concept occurs in a Sullivan progeny
case.  This allusion follows an unremarkable summary of Sullivan’s
view that, “where the criticism is of public officials and their con-
duct of public business, the interest in private reputation is over-
borne by the larger public interest [in] the dissemination of
truth.”118  In the more remarkable footnote to this point, the Court
adds that, “even the [tort] law of privacy,” which evolved to provide
some protection against unwanted publicity, “recognizes severe lim-
itations where public figures or newsworthy facts are concerned.”119
The “limitations” here refer to the public figure and newsworthi-
ness privileges, and the Garrison footnote does not explain why
these privileges should be viewed as relevant to the libel tort with its
different privilege traditions.  If the Court means to draw an im-
plicit analogy by association between the two torts, then this foot-
114. Garrison, 379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964).
115. Id.
116. Id. (accompanying the Garrison caveat with a warning that the Court means to
intimate no views “as to the impact of the constitutional guarantees in the discrete area
of purely private libels”).
117. See Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 192 (D.D.C. 1965) (rejecting extension
of Sullivan to non-official plaintiffs, observing, “we must resist a common temptation to
read a judicial opinion as though it were a chapter in a treatise, and as though the text
of the opinion expounded the law” and “[w]hile dicta may be treated with respect, they
cannot be regarded as part of a statement of the law”).
118. Garrison, 379 U.S. 64, 72-3 (1964).
119. Id. at 73 n.9 (citing Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809-10 (2d Cir.
1940)).
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note may suggest that the privacy privileges provide a relevant
model for resolving the conflict between the public interest in in-
formation and the private interests at stake in a libel suit.
Other Supreme Court hints about the potential extension of
the actual malice rule appear in Time, Inc. v. Hill,120 where the
Court holds that the rule applies to a “false light” privacy suit con-
cerning non-defamatory reports of matters of public interest.121
The Hill plaintiff is not a public official, merely a private citizen
who had “involuntarily become newsworthy”;122 the false speech in
question is a fictionalized account of a headline news event.123
Some of the Hill Court’s rationales resemble Sullivan’s free debate
narrative, and so Hill’s reasoning could be used to justify the exten-
sion of Sullivan to a non-official libel plaintiff.124  The Hill opinion
predictably includes caveats that this result is not dictated by the
opinion.125  Yet instead of couching these caveats in one-line com-
120. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
121. Id. at 387-88. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 281 (inferring that Hill premise is
“that the First Amendment requires that the truthful reporting of newsworthy events
and people not be subject to liability”). But see Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532
(1989) (“Nor need we accept [the] invitation to hold broadly that truthful publication
may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment.”).
122. Kalven, supra note 6, at 279.
123. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 377-79.  The Hill family was held hostage by
escaped convicts, and became the subject of front-page news; thereafter, Robert Hayes
wrote a novel and a play, both entitled THE DESPERATE HOURS, which mixed the facts of
the Hill hostage story with those of others.  In publicizing the play, Life magazine inac-
curately described it as a re-enactment of the Hill family’s experience, and not as a
fictionalized account.  After 11 years of litigation, Hill obtained $30,000 in compensa-
tory damages after a second trial on his false light claim. Id. at 396-97 (reversing the
lower court judgment because the jury instructions did not accurately describe the ac-
tual malice requirement, while noting that a properly instructed jury could have found
actual malice on the facts).  The reargument that led to the reversal of fortune for the
plaintiff was a result of sharp disagreements on the Court. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 289-90 (1985) (6 to 3 vote to affirm
changed to majority vote to reverse), cited in Leonard Garment, Annals of the Law:  The
Hill Case, The New Yorker, at 90-110 (April 17, 1989) (litigation history).
124. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388-89 (basing the actual malice requirement on concerns for
the inevitability of false statement in comment about matters of public interest, for the
need for freedom of discussion to embrace all issues, and for the need for “breathing
space” for negligently false comment in order for the expression of truth to survive
(quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272)).
125. See id. at 384 n.9 (“Our decision today is not to be taken to decide any consti-
tutional questions which may be raised in [libel] actions involving publication of mat-
ters of public interest, or in libel actions where the plaintiff is not a public official.”); id.
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ments, the Hill Court embarks upon a detailed but ambiguous dis-
cussion of distinctions between public officials and private
individuals in libel law.  This discussion may imply that the Sullivan
rule should not be applied to private individuals,126 or that it
should be applied to some individuals but not others.127  The Court
also discusses the public figure privilege, even though this privilege
does not apply to the false light tort at issue in Hill.128  These com-
parisons call attention to the similarities between the interests pro-
tected by libel and privacy torts,129 and arguably suggest that the
public figure concept may be useful in constitutional analysis of li-
bel actions.130
The clearest hints about the extension of Sullivan appear in
Rosenblatt v. Baer,131 where Justice Brennan articulates the vortex
concept that later becomes  an element of Justice Harlan’s public
figure definition in Butts.132  The Rosenblatt Court notes that Sulli-
van recognizes both a “strong interest in debate on public issues,”
and a “strong interest in debate about persons who are in a position
at 390-91 (“[A]lthough the First Amendment principles pronounced in [Sullivan]
guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying these principles in this
discrete context.”).
126. See id. at 391 (“Were this a libel action, the distinction which has been sug-
gested between the relative opportunities of the public official and the private individ-
ual to rebut defamatory charges might be germane.  And the additional state interest in
the protection of the individual against damage to his reputation would be involved.”).
127. See id. (noting that if the suit were a libel action “[d]ifferent considerations
might arise concerning the degree of ‘waiver’ of the protection the State might afford.
But the question whether the same standard should be applicable both to persons vol-
untarily and involuntarily thrust into the public limelight is not here before us.”).
These caveats express the Hill Court’s unwillingness to address arguments in Harlan’s
dissent in Hill. See supra notes 125 and 126; infra text accompanying notes 150-54.
128. See id. at 380-88.  The context of the discussion of public figures was an analysis
of New York precedents that established that truthful reporting of “newsworthy persons
and events” was protected under the state statute that supplied the Hill plaintiff’s “false
light” cause of action. See Hill, 385 U.S. at 382, 384 & 386 n.8. Compare Prosser, supra
note 9, at 413 n.254, and PROSSER, supra note 2, at 844, with Kalven, supra note 6, at 280.
129. See Hill, 385 U.S. at 386 n.9.
130. The lower courts had little opportunity to notice these hints because Hill was
decided only six months before Butts and Walker. But see Comment, Privacy, Defamation,
and the First Amendment:  The Implications of Time, Inc. v. Hill, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 926,
946-52 (1967) (analyzing Hill’s implications for libel law).
131. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
132. Id. at 86 n.12.  Justice Brennan’s dicta in Hill does not treat the thrusting of
oneself into a vortex of discussion as a method for earning public figure status. But see
Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., plurality) (implying this equivalence).
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significantly to influence the resolution of those issues.”133  The
Court then observes that the Rosenblatt plaintiff might satisfy both
elements identified in Sullivan, because of his public position as a
government employee, and because of the public interest in his
conduct.134  This observation is qualified in a footnote by the caveat
that the Court intimates “no view whatever” as to “whether there
are other bases for applying the Sullivan standard.”135  The Court
then provides an example of a case where such other bases might
exist, where “the interests in reputation are relatively insubstantial,
because the subject of discussion has thrust himself into the vortex
of the discussion of a question of pressing public concern.”136  The
Court’s language echoes the public concern element of the fair
comment privilege, which protects libelous opinions about plain-
tiffs who invite controversy through their public positions.137  The
vortex imagery also calls to mind the rationale of the public figure
privilege, which negates the privacy rights of those who engage in
activities that attract public attention.138  In a second footnote, the
Rosenblatt Court emphasizes that, “[t]he public interests protected
by the [Sullivan] rule are interests in discussion, not retaliation,”
and rejects “any suggestion” that “we have tied the [Sullivan] rule to
the rule of official privilege.”139  This comment serves as a dramatic
133. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
134. Id. The Court‘s definition of public official requires that “the public has an
independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person [holding a
government position] beyond the general public interest in [these two characteristics]
of all government employees.” Id. at 86.  The Rosenblatt suit was tried before Sullivan,
and the Court’s remand for a new trial allows the plaintiff to address the “substantial
argument” that he was a public official (as the supervisor of a county-owned ski resort)
and present evidence on actual malice. Id. at 87.
135. Id. at 86 n.12.  In context, one interpretation of this language is that there may
be a basis for applying Sullivan to a case where the element of public interest exists, and
not the element of public position.
136. Id.  The vortex metaphor does not appear in the cases cited by Justice Bren-
nan as support for the Rosenblatt caveat. See infra nn.185-87 and text accompanying
note 184.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
138. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
139. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84 n.10. This disclaimer relates to the Sullivan rationale
that the “citizen-critic” of public officials should have the “fair equivalent” of the immu-
nity from libel suits “granted [to] officials themselves.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-83.
This equivalence is justified on the grounds that it “is as much [the citizen-critic’s] duty
to criticize as it is the official’s duty to govern,” and that given the libel immunity en-
joyed by officials when speaking “within the outer perimeter” of their duties, the lack of
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retraction of the Sullivan rationale that the actual malice rule was
especially appropriate for public officials because of their own libel
immunities.140  Thus, this retraction opens the doctrinal door even
further for the future extension of that rule to some non-official
plaintiffs.141
Other clues in Garrison, Rosenblatt, and Hill take the form of
new narratives with second thoughts about Sullivan’s meaning.
One example of such a narrative is the Garrison Court’s declaration
that “calculated” defamatory falsehood should not enjoy First
Amendment immunity because it is “a tool . . . at once at odds with
the premises of democratic government and with the orderly man-
ner in which economic, social, or political change is to be ef-
fected.”142  Unlike the libels protected by Sullivan, namely false
“utterances honestly believed,” which “contribute to the free in-
terchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth,” the “deliberate
lie” is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas.”143 This “calcu-
lated falsehood” narrative in Garrison alludes to the harms caused
by the Nazis’ political use of defamation, and to harms during the
McCarthy era, when “reckless falsehood” was used to “unseat the
public servant or even topple an administration.”144   This narrative
immunity for citizen-critics from libel suits would “give public servants an unjustified
preference over the public they serve.” Id. at 282 (citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564
(1959)). See supra text accompanying note 106.
140. See Pedrick, supra note 20, at 590-91 (criticizing Sullivan’s official privilege ra-
tionale and approving its repudiation in Rosenblatt).
141. For courts relying on Sullivan’s official privilege rationale to reject extension
of the actual malice rule to non-official plaintiffs, compare Clark v. Pearson, 258 F.
Supp. 188, 193 (D.D.C. 1965); Lorillard v. Field Enter., Inc., 213 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1965); Fignole v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 247 F. Supp. 595, 597-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), with
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966) (noting Rosen-
blatt’s repudiation of the official privilege rationale); Case Comment, Defamation of the
Public Official, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 614, 620-621 (1966) (same).
142. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. But see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 n.19 (observing that
“a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate”).
143. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 73, 75 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S 568,
572 (1942)).
144. Id. at 75.  The McCarthy era, like World War II, is a formative experience for
the judges of the Sullivan era. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 88 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring) (“Those of us alive in the 1940’s and 1950’s witnessed the dreadful ordeal of
people in the public service being pummeled by those inside and outside government,
with charges that were false, abusive, and damaging to the extreme.”); id. at 94 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (“Surely if the 1950’s taught us anything, they taught us that the poison-
ous atmosphere of the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society.”).  For Garrison’s
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR107.txt unknown Seq: 29 20-FEB-06 12:22
2005-2006] ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 109
adds an extra strand to strengthen the actual malice narrative of
Sullivan, and also serves as a rebuttal to the justices who continue to
argue for absolute protection of libels of public officials.145
In Rosenblatt and Hill, some justices break from their silent
agreement with the Sullivan majority,146 proposing new arguments
to compete with Sullivan’s rationales; their proposals, in turn, spark
new commentary on Sullivan from the Court majority.  Justice Stew-
art’s concurrence in Rosenblatt argues in favor of a constitutional
status for the tort of libel because the right to protection of reputa-
tion is “at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”147  In
response, a narrative of concession appears in Rosenblatt, with the
Court’s acknowledgments that there are “important social values
which underlie the law against defamation,” and that “[s]ociety has
a pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks
upon reputation.”148  Yet Rosenblatt’s deferential bow to the value of
the libel remedy is overshadowed by its broad definition of public
officials, which reveals the Court’s willingness to extend the actual
implicit reference to the Nazis, see 379 U.S. at 75 (citing David Riesman, Democracy and
Defamation:  Fair Game and Fair Comment, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1088-1111 (1942)).
See also David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation:  Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 1282 (1942); David Riesman, Control of Group Libel, 42 COLUM. L. REV.
727 (1942). See ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 219 (noting that Riesman “cited the Nazis’
campaigns of calculated libels against opposition politicians and their use of defama-
tion suits as reasons for their ultimate success”).
145. See supra note 94.  Additionally, Justices Black and Douglas continue to ad-
vance the argument for absolute protection in Garrison, 379 U.S. 64; Rosenblatt, 383 U.S.
75; and Butts, 388 U.S. 133.
146. See LEWIS, supra note 7, at 164 (“Justice Brennan had great difficulty marshal-
ing a majority and holding it.”); id. at 170-81 (noting that Justices Harlan, Clark and
White objected to aspects of Justice Brennan’s draft opinions, while Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Stewart supported Brennan’s views throughout the drafting process).
Some justices who joined the Sullivan and Garrison majorities later declined to join
Justice Brennan’s majority opinions in Rosenblatt and Hill. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 88
(Justice Stewart concurred, Justice Clark concurred only in the result, and Justice
Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 411
(1967) (Fortas, J. dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark; Justice
Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part).  Justice Fortas took Justice Goldberg’s
seat on the Court and dissented in Rosenblatt and Hill.  For the positions of the justices
in Butts, 388 U.S. 130, see supra note 11.
147. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“The protection of private
personality . . . is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments” and it is entitled to “recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitu-
tional system.”). See also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (citing Justice Stewart’s concurrence).
148. Id. at 86.
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malice rule “down into the lower ranks of government employ-
ees.”149  The Rosenblatt Court’s interpretation of Sullivan also con-
veys a latent blueprint for the type of non-official plaintiffs who
could be subjected to the actual malice requirement.  Implicitly, as
the scope of the definition of a public official grows, the signifi-
cance of that status becomes more debatable and less meaningful.
Rosenblatt extends the actual malice rule to speech about two types
of official persons: those who “are in a position significantly to influ-
ence the resolution” of “public issues” and those who “invite public
scrutiny and discussion.”150  If some non-official persons also fit
these two categories, then First Amendment protection of libels
about these persons arguably serves the same ends as protection of
libels of similar officials.
No narrative of concession appears in Hill as a response to Jus-
tice Harlan’s dissent, which condemns the court’s extension of Sul-
livan’s principles.  Harlan advocates a negligence standard for non-
official plaintiffs who are involuntarily exposed to irresponsible
publicity whose subject matter is not “at the center of public de-
bate.”  Harlan argues that the press needs only “limited breathing
space,”151  because the state’s interest in sanctioning even non-de-
famatory false speech is weightier than the First Amendment inter-
est in protecting a robust press from chilling effect.  Harlan reasons
that the lack of public interest in the speech disables the operation
of the marketplace of ideas, and denies the plaintiff a forum for
“refutation” of false speech in the media.  Then the actual malice
rule operates to deny “easily injured,” “powerless,” and deserving
149. Id. at 85 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283 n.23).
150. Id. at 85, 86 n.13 (requiring that “[t]he employee’s position must be one
which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely
apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in contro-
versy”). But see Eaton, supra note 2, at 1377 & 1377 n.121 (finding that the Rosenblatt
distinction between “scrutiny of the position occupied and scrutiny occasioned by the
particular charges in controversy has been all but ignored”).
151. Hill, 385 U.S. at 405-07.  Justice Harlan concurs in the need for reversal, but
his opinion in other respects is a dissent.  Notably, he disagrees with the Court’s brief
finding that the subject of the Life article, “the opening of a new play linked to an actual
incident,” was a matter of public interest. Id. at 388.  Harlan opines that when facts are
of “limited public interest [and] intimate and potentially embarrassing to an individ-
ual,” the State may sanction speech to deter its publication; he determines that the
public had no “independent interest” in the relationship between the Hill incident and
the play covered in the Life article. Id. at 404, 407.
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plaintiffs a remedy in court.152  The Hill Court does not rise to
Harlan’s bait, except to argue that in a false light suit, only the ac-
tual malice rule will provide sufficient protection for speech about
matters of public interest.  This is because the non-defamatory con-
tent of false light speech “affords no warning of prospective harm
to another through falsity,” and because a negligence test would
leave the press “with the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury
might assess the reasonableness of steps taken [to] verify the accu-
racy of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.”153  This re-
buttal is insufficient to prevent Harlan’s ideas from attracting
support for his Butts plurality from additional justices, and later the
Gertz Court refashions Harlan’s “broken marketplace” narrative
into rationales that redefine those of Sullivan.154
The Hill Court adds a new strand to the Sullivan narrative con-
cerning the value of protecting speech about public issues, by rea-
soning that “[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues
about which information is needed,” not merely “political expres-
sion” or comment about “public affairs.”155  This comment is yet
another sign that the Court may be preparing to extend the actual
malice rule beyond the context of public officials.156  Another im-
plicit theme in this narrative embraces the principles that the pub-
lic aspects of “published matter which exposes persons to public
view” are “interlaced inextricably with comments on individuals,”
and that “mixed utterance”157 speech “is vast and of high impor-
tance to civilized life.”158  The importance of this new Hill narrative
is clouded, however, by the opinion’s cautions regarding its un-
known implications for libel suits.159  Given the conflicting signals
152. Id. at 407-10.
153. Id. at 389.
154. See infra note 302 (referencing arguments that public officials have a greater
opportunity to correct false statements in Sullivan and Rosenblatt than do private
individuals).
155. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940),
concerning the scope for freedom of discussion).
156. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 282-83 (opining that Sullivan is a “silent partner” in
the Hill decision).
157. Id. (citing U.S. v. Dennis, 183 F.2d. 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1959)).
158. Id. (“The risk [of] exposure [of the self to others] is an essential incident of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press.” (citing
Hill, 385 U.S. at 388)).
159. Hill, 385 U.S. at 391. See also supra notes 125-130.
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supplied by the Court’s ambiguous hints and complicating narra-
tives in Garrison, Rosenblatt, and Hill, it is not surprising that the
predictions about the future scope of the Sullivan rule are almost as
numerous as the commentators making the predictions.160
B. The Favorable and Unfavorable Camps of Lower Court Opinion
Concerning the Extension of the Actual Malice Rule
After Sullivan creates the new First Amendment libel privilege,
attorneys press arguments for the application of the actual malice
rule to plaintiff officials of high and low degree,161 to candidates for
public office,162 to associates of such officials and candidates,163 to
160. For predictions about the types of cases to which the Sullivan rule will be ex-
tended, see, for example, Pedrick, supra note 20, at 592 (to “issues where the public
judgment can make itself felt through official or unofficial communication” so that “it
can be said that the matter is one of proper public concern”); Bertelsman, supra note
82, at 661-62 (to cases where plaintiffs are “those who take an active part in public
controversy” because of a “legitimate public interest” in their conduct); Robert E.
Dineen, Note, Constitutional Law — Proof of Actual Malice Required in Libel Action for De-
famatory Falsehood Related to Official Conduct, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 132,  135 (1964) (to
create “a qualified privilege for misstatements of fact in discussion of public issues,
equal to that of the fair comment rule”); McNamara, supra note 77, at 1444 (“only [to]
those persons closely connected with government”); Note, The Scope of First Amendment
Protection for Good Faith Defamatory Error, 75 YALE L. J. 642, 652 (1966) (to cases where
libel involves “a private trait which is sufficiently relevant to the public role” of the
plaintiff “to make that trait a public issue”); Note, Defamation of the Public Official, supra
note 141, at 620 (when subject matter of the statement is one of “legitimate public
concern”); John M. Huggins, Constitutional Law—Freedom of the Press — Libel — State Law
Allowing Libel Suit by Public Official Without Proof of Malice Held Unconstitutional — New
York Times v. Sullivan, 42 TEX. L. REV. 1080, 1084 (1964) (to those who “exert a strong
influence on the operations of the government and affect an unusually large number of
people”); Case Comment, Constitutional Law — First Amendment Requires Qualified Privi-
lege to Punish Defamatory Misstatements about Public Officials, supra note 77, at 289 (to “indi-
viduals who set the policies” of “political parties, large corporations, labor unions, and
lobbying groups”).
161. For cases applying Sullivan, see, for example, Fegley v. Morthimer, 202 A.2d
125 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) (school board member); McNabb v. Tennessean Newspapers,
Inc., 400 S.W.2d 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (chair of county Democratic primary
board). See 19 A.L.R.3d 1361, 1371-78 (1968).
162. For cases applying Sullivan to candidates, see, for example, Block v. Benton,
255 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964); State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965). See also Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971)
(applying Sullivan to candidate for U. S. Senate); Ocala Star-Banner v. Damron, 401
U.S. 295, 299-300 (1971) (finding defeated candidate for tax assessor made insufficient
showing of actual malice). See 19 A.L.R.3d 1361,1378-89 (1968).
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famous persons,164 to active participants in public debate on issues
of “grave public concern,”165 and to those whose conduct becomes
the subject of public controversy.166  Some courts find that “[t]here
is not the slightest implication in the [Sullivan] opinion that the
[actual malice rule] should be extended to persons who are not
public officials.”167  These courts recognize a unique value in pro-
tecting the right to criticize government officials,168 because of its
link to the right to criticize government, which is indispensable for
the operation of a democracy.169  For such courts, criticism of non-
official plaintiffs is not related to debates about government policy
or to the practices of self-government.
Other courts recognize that the refusal to extend the actual
malice rule will negate the spirit of the Sullivan opinion.170  These
pro-extension courts assume that the purpose of protecting criti-
163. Compare Gilberg v. Goffi, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964) (applying
Sullivan to law partner of mayor) with Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188 (D.D.C. 1965)
(not applying Sullivan to lawyer associating with Congressman). See 19 A.L.R.3d 1361,
1379-84 (1968).
164. See Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964) (rejecting
Sullivan in libel suit because plaintiff is famous boxer, not public official).  Defendants’
counsel also sought the application of Sullivan to privacy suits. See, e.g., Youssoupoff v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 265 N.Y.S.2d 754 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Spahn, 221 N.E.2d
543. See infra note 206.
165. See, e.g., Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964); Paul-
ing v. Nat’l Review, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
166. For refusals to extend Sullivan to non-official plaintiffs, see, for example, Pear-
son v. Fairbanks Publ’g Co., 248 F. Supp. 188 (D. Alaska 1965); Lorillard v. Field Enter.,
Inc., 213 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
167. Lorillard, 213 N.E.2d at 7. See also Clark, 248 F. Supp. at 195; Spahn, 221 N.E.2d
at 545-46; Dempsey, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 756. Compare Prosser, supra note 2, at 815 (“[T]he
[Sullivan] decision provides no clue as to whether [a constitutional privilege will be
created for] comment on other matters of public concern”).
168. See Clark, 248 F. Supp. 195 (arguing that the right to criticize the government
“is regarded as indispensable in a popular form of government” but “this theory has no
logical application to criticisms or attacks” on others); Youssoupoff, 265 N.Y.S.2d 754,
758 (opining that public officials need constant scrutiny to stop “[e]xcesses of power
and [misconduct] that can only be remedied by a public aroused through information
imparted to them by unfettered sources of news”).
169. Clark, 248 F. Supp. at 195.
170. Walker v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 246 F. Supp. 231, 233-34
(W.D. Ky. 1965) (arguing that “to have any meaning the [Sullivan] protections must be
extended to other categories of individuals or persons [who] have become involved in
matters of public concern”), rev’d on other grounds, 368 F.2d 189, 190 (6th Cir. 1966)
(noting the “motivating force behind [Sullivan] compels its applicability” to such
cases).
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cism of public officials is to serve the greater goal of protecting the
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open.”171  They
consider the use of the actual malice rule essential to the achieve-
ment of this goal, as long as debate about non-official plaintiffs may
be connected to debate about public issues.  For these courts and
for some commentators, the position of the anti-extension courts
seems to have at least two weaknesses.  First, it seems artificial to
limit the actual malice rule to suits by public officials because this
category includes only a small portion of all libels related to debates
about public issues.172  Second, this limitation produces the arbi-
trary result that libels concerning minor public officials are given
more protection than those concerning important non-officials
who play a role in these debates.173  As one court opines, “the right
to criticize a public agent engaged in public activities” should not
depend upon that person being “arbitrarily labeled a public
official.”174
171. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added)  (“Thus we consider this case
against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that de-
bate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials.”).  The reference to “public officials” is interpreted by some pro-
extension courts as merely one type of debate about “public issues,” while some anti-
extension courts interpret that reference as an exclusive illustration of the type of de-
bate to be covered by the Sullivan rule. See, e.g., Gilligan v. King, 264 N.Y.S.2d 309, 313-
14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965) (emphasizing “public issues” term in ruling that police officer is
“public official”).
172. See Pedrick, supra note 20, at 591 (observing that to limit free discussion to
“the official conduct of public officials” seems “quixotic if weight is given to the func-
tion in democratic society served by the press and other media”); Note, The Scope of First
Amendment Protection for Good Faith Defamatory Error, supra note 160, at 644-45 (noting
that issues in which “the public has a genuine concern are not confined to an official
level”).
173. See, e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir.
1966) (arguing that criticism of private citizen-leaders is not less important than criti-
cism of government officials, especially compared to criticism of “comparatively minor
public officials”); Bertelsman, supra note 82, at 659 (opining that the “analysis of who is
and who is not a public official” is “sterile and mechanistic”); Gerard B. Rickey, Note,
Constitutional Law—Freedom of Speech and of the Press—Criminal Liability for Criticism of
Public Officers, 19 Sw. L. J. 399, 407 (1965) (“[P]rotection of statements against all public
officials . . . seems unnecessary, while protection of statements against some controver-
sial public figures seems highly desirable.”).
174. See, e.g., Pauling, 362 F.2d at 195 (citing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 95
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting)).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR107.txt unknown Seq: 35 20-FEB-06 12:22
2005-2006] ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 115
Yet no court seems to doubt that some libels should remain
outside the Sullivan standard.175  The Rosenblatt narrative concern-
ing the “important social value” of the libel remedy strikes a chord
with judges who declare that, “[t]he law of libel [is] one of the
branches of law that [protects] individual civil rights” and “should
not be whittled away.”176  Other judges express support for pre-Sul-
livan libel law by opining that an expansion of the actual malice
rule to cover all plaintiffs “would radically alter the law of libel and
too severely limit the class of libels for which redress would lie.”177
These affirmations reveal that lower court judges continue to view
the libel remedy as a tradition to be preserved.  This view exists de-
spite the perception that the Sullivan Court has “shifted the balance
sharply in favor of the freedom of public discussion” and away from
“the safeguarding of individual reputation.”178  Few courts express
concern, however, that Sullivan requires either a restriction of the
broad definition of defamatory speech179 or modification of the va-
rious libel privileges.180
One of the earliest suggestions that Sullivan could not be lim-
ited to suits by public officials appears in an opinion by Judge
Henry Friendly181  in a libel suit brought by Dr. Linus Pauling182
175. See, e.g., Afro-American Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Lower courts generally treat the absolute protection argument of Justices Black, Doug-
las and Goldberg in Sullivan with silence.
176. Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 195 (D.D.C. 1965). See Afro-American, 366
F.2d at 657 (citing Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 92-93 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
177. Afro-American, 366 F.2d at 664.
178. Pauling v. Nat’l Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
179. Compare Clark v. Allen, 204 A.2d 42, 47-48 (Pa. 1964) (taking guidance from
Sullivan to promote free discussion in order to bring “home to the American people”
the “menace and dangers of Communism,” and thus, holding that being accused of a
voting record with “Communist tendencies” is not libelous) with PROSSER, supra note 2,
§ 106, at 761 (concluding that accusation of Communist affiliation or sympathy in 1964
“is all but universally regarded as clearly defamatory”).
180. But see Pearson v. Fairbanks Publ’g Co., 413 P.2d 711, 713-14 (Alaska 1966)
(modifying honest misstatement of fact privilege to incorporate Sullivan definition of
actual malice).
181. Judge Henry J. Friendly is a distinguished jurist who clerked for Justice Bran-
deis and served from 1959 to 1986 on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
See Erwin N. Griswold, In Memorian: Henry J. Friendly, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1720, 1720-22
(1986); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973); HENRY J.
FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS: SELECTED PAPERS BY AN EMINENT FEDERAL JUDGE (1967); HENRY
J. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION
OF STANDARDS (1962).
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against the New York Daily News.183  Judge Friendly initially observes
in dicta that it would seem “questionable” whether “in principle”
the Sullivan decision might be limited to the case of public officials;
he concludes that once the rule is extended to a “candidate for
public office,” then “the participant in public debate on an issue of
grave public concern would be next in line.”184  While some courts
hesitate to embrace this conclusion,185 other courts agree with
Judge Friendly’s dicta and cite his “participant in the public debate”
concept,186 along with Justice Brennan’s vortex metaphor,187 in ex-
tending the actual malice rule to plaintiffs who fit these hypotheti-
cal categories.188
182. Pauling is “a man of international repute,” a Cal Tech professor who won the
Nobel Prize in Chemistry and the Nobel Peace Prize; his “publicly expressed views on
many questions” are “contrary to those expressed by [the] right wing elements” in the
country.  Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 189 (8th Cir. 1966).
183. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).  A News editorial
criticized Pauling, who had been “agitating against nuclear weapons and weapon tests,”
for “profess[ing] to be horrified by Khrushchev’s announcement of Soviet resumption
of nuclear weapon tests,” and then merely “record[ing] a plea to his friend the Kremlin
to reconsider.” Id. at 661 n.1.  Pauling argued that the editorial libeled him as being
pro-Communist, but the jury verdict for the News was affirmed on appeal, and the court
found no need to rely on Sullivan. Id. at 663.
184. Id. at 671.
185. For courts noting Friendly’s dicta but not extending Sullivan, see, for exam-
ple, Afro-American Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Fignole v.
Curtis Publ’g Co., 247 F. Supp. 595, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Pearson, 413 P.2d at 714, 714
n.15; Nusbaum v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 206 A.2d 185, 197 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1965); State v. Browne, 206 A.2d 591, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1965); Youssoupoff v. Colum-
bia Broad. Sys., Inc., 265 N.Y.S.2d 754, 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
186. For courts citing Friendly’s dicta with approval, see, for example, Pauling, 362
F.2d at 197; Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev’d, 368
F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966); Pauling v. Nat’l Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966).
187. For courts citing the Rosenblatt vortex in extending Sullivan, see, for example,
Pauling, 362 F.2d at 195-98; Pauling, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 15-17.
188. Some lower courts interpret footnote 23 of Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284 n.23, as
implying that the actual malice rule could extend to non-officials because the Court
refuses to “specify categories of persons” who will or will not be defined as public offi-
cials. See, e.g., Walker, 246 F. Supp. at 233; Pauling, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 14.  But the Court
had other reasons for footnote 23. See supra note 110.
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C. A Libel Privilege for Public Persons:  The Lower Courts
Formulate Boundaries and Rationales
For pro-extension courts, the most cautious extension of the
actual malice rule requires a formula that may be linked by close
analogy to the doctrines of Sullivan.  The public figure privilege
does not fit that requirement, and so it is not surprising that courts
reject the public figure status of a plaintiff as the sole justification
for applying the actual malice rule.189  Even counsel for the media
defendant in Butts fails to mention the public figure concept in his
Supreme Court brief, which suggests that this concept is not viewed
as a ready-made tool for constructing an extension of Sullivan.190
By contrast, the vocabulary of the Friendly and Brennan formulas
appeals to the judges who correctly anticipate that the Court will
extend Sullivan to some non-official plaintiffs.  These formulas en-
compass plaintiffs who actively seek the public stage for their opin-
ions, and do not encompass all newsworthy persons or all unknown
persons caught up in newsworthy events.  As it happens, however,
the formulas proposed by the Butts opinions are not endorsed in
the pre-Butts extension precedents.191
In their analyses of the extension issue, judges emphasize both
the nature of the speech about the libel plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
characteristics.  This intellectual double helix mimics the variables
used by the Sullivan Court for the actual malice holding that covers
“debate on public issues” relating to official conduct of a public
189. See infra note 206.
190. Herbert Wechsler, counsel for the Times in Sullivan, represented the publisher
of the Saturday Evening Post in the Butts case, and neither Wechsler nor opposing coun-
sel in Butts mentioned the public figure concept in their briefs.  Counsel for Respon-
dent Walker argued that the actual malice rule should not be extended to plaintiffs
based on their public figure status alone, citing lower court precedents, but counsel for
the Petitioner Associated Press did not argue for such an extension. See Brief for Resp’t
at 41-44, Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (No. 150) [hereinafter Brief for
Resp’t Walker]; Brief for Pet’r at 31-42, Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)
(No. 150) [hereinafter Brief for Pet’r Associated Press]. See infra note 245.  For brief
references to the term public figure in the Walker briefs, see Brief for the Tribune Co.
as Amicus Curiae at 4, Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (No. 150) [here-
inafter Amicus Brief for Tribune Co.] (arguing that the Court should ground its deci-
sion on “a broader base than the doctrine of ‘public official’ or ‘public figure’”); Brief
for Pet’r Associated Press at 41, (quoting an excerpt from Walker v. Associated Press,
417 P.2d 486, 490 (Colo. 1966), which mentions the term); id. at 28, 29, 30.
191. See infra text accompanying notes 202-09; infra notes 203, 204, 206.
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official.192  Courts on both sides of the extension debate borrow the
Sullivan vocabulary of public concern, echoing the libel privileges,
to describe the speech topic to be protected in an extension case.193
But for vocabulary to describe the plaintiff’s characteristics, judges
rely on the libel and publicity privileges, and even their own
phrases.  They use the labels of “public man,” “public person,” “per-
son in public life,” “public personage,” “public figure,” or more
than one of these labels together, without referring to the special-
ized connotations of these terms.194  Yet neither Justice Brennan
nor Judge Friendly choose to attach such status labels to their for-
mulas.  Instead, they use their own words to describe the character-
istics of the participant plaintiff, or the plaintiff who thrusts her
personality into the vortex.195  Although they follow the lower court
tradition of borrowing the public concern idiom of Sullivan and the
libel privileges,196 they narrow the scope of the protected speech
topic to issues of “grave” or “pressing” concern.197
192. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 (observing that the Times advertisement qualifies “for
constitutional protection” because it is “an expression of grievance and protest on one
of the major public issues of our time”); id. at 279 (holding that the actual malice rule
applies to libels relating to “official conduct” of a “public official”).
193. For cases extending Sullivan and citing public concern, see, for example, cases
cited supra notes 183, 186.  For cases rejecting extension and citing public concern, see,
for example, cases cited supra note 175 and infra note 207.
194. See, e.g., Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 197 (8th Cir.
1966) (public figure); Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky.
1965), rev’d, 368 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966) (public man); Walker v. Associated Press, 417
P.2d 486, 490 (Colo. 1966) (public personage); Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp. 188, 195
(D.D.C. 1965) (public person).
195. Brennan draws support for his vortex metaphor from the libel privilege tradi-
tion. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.12 (citing Peck v. Coos Bay Times Publ’g Co., 259
P. 307, 311-312 (Or. 1927)); Peck, 259 P. at 312 (“When a man enters the political
arena, even though not a candidate, he must not be too sensitive about criticism.  There
are generally blows to receive as well as to give.”).
196. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280-83.  Some courts resort to the idiom of the libel privi-
leges in their extension debate opinions. See, e.g., Afro-American Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe,
366 F.2d 649, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (finding that actual malice rule should not be
extended to a plaintiff who does not qualify for libel privilege); Pauling v. Nat’l Review,
Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (observing that “‘public men, are, as it
were, public property’” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 268)).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 136, 184.
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The failure of these two judges to attach the public figure label
to their formulas is understandable,198 given the number of ways in
which the public figure privilege does not match the contours of
the Sullivan framework.  First, unlike the Sullivan privilege, the
public figure privilege is not limited to speech regarding debate on
public issues, but extends to speech regarding all subjects of public
curiosity.199  Second, the actual malice rule embraced in Sullivan is
irrelevant to the public figure privilege.200  Third, the public official
category in Sullivan is not analogous to the public figure categories
of newsworthy persons, persons who are “public figures for a sea-
son,”201 or persons who are passive objects of public fascination.  In
short, Brennan’s vortex plaintiff and Friendly’s participant plaintiff
occupy subcategories in the public figure class that have no label,
and so the attachment of the generic public figure label to these
characters would serve only to blur their distinctive profiles.  Bren-
nan and Friendly prefer to use new vocabulary to describe active
plaintiffs whose activities are most analogous to those of public offi-
cials, whose active conduct is required in order to win elections or
secure government employment.202
Even so, lower court judges see no impediment to mixing the
Brennan and Friendly labels with other public person labels in their
198. Moreover, when Friendly announces his prediction in 1964 that Sullivan
would extend to participants in public debates, he does not have the benefit of the
Court’s later hints in Garrison, Rosenblatt and Hill. See supra Part III.A.
199. The protection of speech in the public interest is a purpose of both the public
figure and newsworthiness privileges, but this concept is not synonymous with speech
about “debate about public issues” in Sullivan.  Prosser, supra note 9, at 412-14.  The
territory of the public figure privilege covers only “matters reasonably within the scope
of the public interest which they have aroused,” including depictions of the family of a
public figure. Id. at 412, 414.  The newsworthiness privilege covers all kinds of informa-
tion, including “interesting phases of human activity in general.” Id. at 413. See supra
text accompanying notes 29-37; infra note 124.  One limit on the public figure privilege
is decency. See Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d. 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940), cited in
Franklin, supra note 16, at 109-10, 110 n. 18; PROSSER, supra note 2, at 837. See also Irwin
O. Spiegel, Public Celebrity v. Scandal Magazine — The Celebrity’s Right to Privacy, 30 SO.
CAL. L. REV. 280, 302-08 (1957).
200. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
201. Prosser, supra note 9, at 413.
202. See supra note 30 (examples of public figures); supra note 76 (examples of
public men).  The plaintiffs who fit the Brennan or Friendly categories occupy a niche
that is smaller than either the plaintiff class subject to the libel privileges, or the class of
public figures who are either newsworthy persons or persons caught up in newsworthy
events.
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opinions. The public figure term may be found in two different
contexts in opinions on the extension issue.203  First, the label is
mentioned by some pro-extension courts, along with other factors,
as a reason for imposing the actual malice rule on a non-official
plaintiff.  These other factors usually include the variables articu-
lated in the Brennan and Friendly formulas,204 and the libel privi-
lege status of plaintiffs who are public men or submit their
controversial opinions to the public.205  In a second context, the
public figure label appears whenever a defendant argues that pub-
lic figure status alone is a sufficient reason for the application of the
actual malice rule.  Courts reject this argument in both libel and
privacy cases where defendants are sued by a public figure who does
not fit the Brennan or Friendly formulas and belongs only to the
public figure class of celebrity objects of public interest.206
The requested extension of Sullivan to all public figures seems
extreme to these courts because the public figure category is so
broad.  For example, in a libel suit brought by Jack Dempsey, the
famous heavyweight boxing champion, the defendant argues that
the plaintiff’s status as a public figure gives the public a “legitimate
interest in [being] able to evaluate” statements of fact “about the
public affairs of [a] public hero.”207  The court refuses to accept
this argument because its “net effect” would be to extend the actual
malice rule “to all public figures,” and thereby expose such figures
“to naked libel” simply “because of the mere fact” that they are
203. The public figure term does not appear at all in some decisions on the exten-
sion issue. See, e.g., Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky. 1965),
rev’d, 368 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966); Gilberg v. Goffi, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 831-32 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1964).  In other decisions, the public figure label is mentioned only in a reference
taken from another decision, and not in the court’s own analysis. See, e.g., Afro-Ameri-
can Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
204. See, e.g., Pauling v. Nat’l Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966);
Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486, 490 (Colo. 1966).  Most of the pro-extension
cases involve Pauling and Walker, who made bad law for themselves by filing multiple
suits and establishing pro-extension precedents that influenced the rulings in their
other suits. See, e.g., Pauling, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 17 (citing Pauling v. News Syndicate Co.,
335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964)); Walker, 417 P.2d at 490 (citing Walker, 246 F. Supp. at
231).
205. See supra note 196.
206. For rejections in libel cases, see, for example, Clark v. Pearson, 248 F. Supp.
188, 195 (D.D.C. 1965). See also cases cited supra note 164.
207. Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 252 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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“public individual[s].”208  Another court voices this concern while
rejecting the actual malice rule for public figure plaintiffs in a pri-
vacy suit for “appropriation of personality” because the rule would
subject both “private citizens” and public figures to “a broadside
invasion of their rights of privacy.”209  The idea that a narrower First
Amendment definition of public figures could be created does not
occur to lower court judges.  They find it challenging enough to
interpret the Supreme Court’s constitutional reconfigurations of
common law doctrine without inventing their own.210
The pro-extension courts need to articulate rationales for their
formulations of cautious analogies to the double helix of public de-
bate speech and public official plaintiffs; one popular strategy for
some courts is to reaffirm the relevance of the original Sullivan nar-
ratives to support their extension holdings.  The free debate narra-
tive is broad enough to justify the actual malice rule for non-official
plaintiffs,211 as one pro-extension court recognizes in opining that,
“democratic government is best served when citizens” may “freely
speak out on a question of public concern, even if thereby some
individual be wrongly calumniated.”212  Another court observes that
the dangers of self-censorship exist for critics of “a private person
who publicly, prominently, actively” leads “a public discussion.”213
This sentiment is echoed in the declaration by another court that
public debate will not be “‘uninhibited, robust and wide open’ if
the news media are compelled to stand legally in awe of error in
208. Id. (rejecting extension of actual malice rule in libel suit where story reported
information from Dempsey’s deceased manager that Dempsey won his championship
title forty-five years earlier by the use of “loaded gloves”). See also Clark, 248 F. Supp. at
197 (“The fact that some persons are better known than others should not lead to any
far-reaching distinction in their [libel] rights.”).
209. Youssoupoff v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 265 N.Y.S.2d 754, 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965).
210.  See Eaton, supra note 2, at 1371 (citing, e.g., Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356
(1965)) (noting that some courts mistakenly approve erroneous jury instructions that
require reversal); id. at 1381, 1386-88 (finding that some courts erroneously assume
that Sullivan requires actual damages to be proved once actual malice is established, but
this rule is required later only in libel actions arising out of labor disputes).
211. For the free debate narrative, see supra text accompanying notes 87-95; supra
text accompanying notes 106-07; supra note 171.
212. Gilberg v. Goffi, 251 N.Y.S.2d 823, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
213. Pauling v. Nat’l Review, Inc., 269 N.Y.S.2d 11, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
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reporting the words and actions of persons of national prominence
and influence.”214
Lower courts on both sides of the extension debate articulate a
second theme related to the Sullivan rationale that public officials
should be “men of fortitude” who are able to “thrive in a hardy
climate”215 by tolerating false and defamatory criticism in the
course of their political careers.  Some courts see how this expecta-
tion may be imposed upon plaintiffs who are not professional politi-
cians but who inhabit the territory of political debates with its
accompanying hostile climate.  These courts describe a vision of life
in Brennan’s vortex where defamation injuries are the norm.  Ac-
cording to different courts who share this view, in the “give-and-
take of public debate,” even non-official persons must expect to en-
counter “sharp and coarse comment,”216 and to “endure exposure
to the vicissitudes of argument,”217 while those involved in political
campaigns must expect to be maligned by “mudslinging, half truths
and outright lies.”218  Moreover, for those who take their opinions
to the “public stage,” an “error in reported occurrence is more apt
to become the rule rather than the exception.”219  Thus, those who
seek the spotlight must be prepared “to accept the errors of the
searching beams of the glow thereof, for only in such rays can [the]
public know what role” they play.220  These observations arguably
imply that even libel remedies before Sullivan did not effectively
alter the libelous climate of the vortex.  Therefore, since these con-
ditions are inevitable, the active participants on the “stage of public
214. Walker v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev’d, 368
F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1966).
215. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
216. Afro-American Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
217. Gilberg, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 832 (further observing that “half-truths, misinforma-
tion, and worse, are not uncommon in the furor and in the tempo of a political
campaign”).
218. Clark v. Allen, 204 A.2d 42, 44 (Pa. 1964) (also noting that “[i]t is deplorable
but true that during a political campaign, candidates and their supporters often in-
dulge in gross exaggeration, invectives, distorted statements, . . . [and] prophecies of
war and doom if the opponent is elected”).
219. Walker, 246 F. Supp. at 234.
220. Id. (further opining that a nationally prominent person must realize that his
active advocacy is likely to attract the press and magnify “the chance that his activities
would be erroneously reported”).
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prominence”221 must recognize that the bruises of libel will accom-
pany the benefits of the spotlight.
One variation upon the formulas of Brennan and Friendly ap-
pears in Judge Blackmun’s analysis in another suit by Pauling, in
which the latent Rosenblatt blueprint is used to apply the actual mal-
ice rule to a plaintiff without government portfolio who is in a posi-
tion to influence public issues.222  Blackmun creates a variety of
descriptions for such a plaintiff, as someone possessing “a capacity
for influencing public policy” either because of prominence or un-
official power, and seeking “to realize” upon it so as “to influence
the resolution” of important issues.223  This focus on the latent
power and potential impact of some influence-seeking plaintiffs
serves as a reminder that Sullivan singles out public officials for the
actual malice rule for a reason, presumably because their status car-
ries the inherent power to play a leadership role concerning the
public issues of the day.  Blackmun concludes that there is no ra-
tional distinction between the critics of his leader-influencer citi-
zens “who seek to lead in the determination of national policy” and
the critics of public officials, in terms of their needs for First
Amendment protection.224
The boundaries of the concepts articulated by Brennan,
Friendly, and Blackmun support the exclusion of certain plaintiffs
and speech topics from the actual malice rule.  For example, Bren-
nan’s vortex and Friendly’s participant concepts exclude plaintiffs
who do not seek to become involved in public debates, those who
221. Id.
222. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 194 (8th Cir. 1966) (cit-
ing Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966)). See supra text accompanying notes 151-52;
supra note 182.  In the post-Butts era, Justice Blackmun supports the Rosenbloom exten-
sion of Sullivan to speech about matters relating to the “public or general concern,” but
later joins the Gertz majority in repudiating that position. Compare Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (Brennan, J., plurality), with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that his vote is needed to
create a majority and avoid doctrinal “uncertainty,” and predicting that the difference
between the Rosenbloom and Gertz rules will have little practical effect on journalists).
223. Pauling, 362 F.2d at 195-96.  Blackmun’s sources for his pro-extension decision
includes Friendly’s participant concept, Brennan’s vortex idea, and the Rosenblatt foot-
note retracting Sullivan’s official privilege rationale. See id. at 194, 196-97.
224. Id. at 196.  Blackmun’s examples of such private leader-influencer citizens in-
clude “[a] lobbyist, a person dominant in a political party, the head of any pressure
group, or any significant leader.” Id.
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are involuntarily swept into them, and those who are engaged only
in a discussion of private issues.  Blackmun implicitly approves of
the latter limitation by noting that “there is no comparable need
[for public discussion] as to the attributes of private citizens,” in-
cluding even those who “succeeded in acquiring” public atten-
tion.225  He also opines that it is understandable that anti-extension
courts reject the actual malice rule in “cases where the subject, al-
though perhaps a public figure, did not conduct himself or speak
out on a matter of public import.”226  Public figure status could be
acquired involuntarily according to publicity tort doctrine, and so
this status does not match the active role envisioned by the judges
who prefer to use the participant, vortex, and leader-influencer
concepts.227
When the Supreme Court agrees to review one of retired Ma-
jor General Edwin Walker’s suits,228 it appears to present an easy
case for a cautious expansion of Sullivan beyond the public official
context.  Walker claims to be libeled by a press release concerning
the riot at the University of Mississippi in response to James Mere-
dith’s attempt to enroll there.  An AP report states that Walker “as-
sumed command” of a crowd of protesters and led a charge against
federal marshals during their attempt to protect Meredith.229
225. Id.
226. Id. at 197 (citing cases cited supra note 164).  Blackmun otherwise ignores the
public figure term in his analysis and describes Pauling as a person who “projected
himself into the arena of public policy, public controversy, and ‘pressing public con-
cern.’” Id. at 197.
227. For a decision citing Blackmun’s Pauling opinion, see Reaves v. Foster, 200
So.2d 453, 459 (Miss. 1967).
228. The Court granted review of Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 351 F.2d 701 (5th Cir.
1965) and Associated Press v. Walker, 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See Curtis
Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967).  The trials in Butts and Walker occurred
before Sullivan, but Rosenblatt applies the actual malice standard to such trials. See Ro-
senblatt, 383 U.S. at 87-88.  The Court affirms the Butts verdict and reverses the Walker
verdict. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140, 142.  For the positions of the justices on the public figure
issue, see supra note 11; for the positions of the justices on the actual malice issue, see
supra note 10.
229. Butts, 388 U.S. at 141 n.4 (Harlan, J., plurality).  Two people died in the riot at
Ole Miss, at least fifty were injured, 160 were arrested, and sixteen cars were destroyed.
Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 15.  Walker testified that he had urged the protestors
on the scene to use restraint and to conduct a peaceful protest. Butts, 388 U.S. at 141.
The AP press release is defamatory because it accuses Walker of criminal conduct. See
Brief for Resp’t Walker at 4-5.  Walker resigned from the Army to enter politics and run
for Governor of Texas.  Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 6.  After commanding federal
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Three lower courts extend the actual malice rule to Walker based
on the criteria of one or more of the leading formulas.  Walker is a
participant in a debate about a matter of grave public concern,
namely federal intervention to aid integration;230 his press confer-
ences and appearance at the demonstration show that he “volunta-
rily thrust himself into the vortex of public discussion” of
integration;231 and his repeated publicity-seeking efforts demon-
strate an attempt to use his “leadership and influence” to “mold
public thought and opinion.”232  Walker’s public life is also well
known, and could be labeled as that of a public figure; or based on
his Army career and political activities,233 he could be labeled a
public man.234  A press release is understandably vulnerable to er-
ror as an “on the spot” dispatch from the scene of violent and fast
moving events.235  The number of Walker’s multiple suits brought
troops in Little Rock “during the school segregation confrontation,” Walker became
opposed to federal intervention in conflicts over integration. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140.
During appearances before the riot, Walker advocated “defiance of court orders and
federal power,” called for “violent vocal protest,” and urged people to “[r]ise to stand
beside Governor Ross Barnett at Jackson, Mississippi.” Id. at 159 n.22.  In radio broad-
cast comments, Walker stated, “We have talked, listened and been pushed around far
too much by the anti-Christ Supreme Court,” and, “This [use of federal troops] today is
a disgrace to the Nation in ‘Dire Peril’ – a disgrace beyond the capacity of anyone
except its enemies.”  Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 11, 13.  Walker’s judgment of
$500,000 in compensatory damages is reversed by the Supreme Court in Butts for lack
of actual malice evidence; his punitive damages award of $300,000 is reversed by lower
courts on the same ground under state law. Butts, 388 U.S. at 140-42, 158-59.  For an
overview of the legal aspects of the events surrounding James Meredith’s enrollment,
see Joel William Friedman, Biography of John Minor Wisdom ch. 7 (May 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with Prof. Friedman of Tulane University Law School).
230. Walker v. Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486, 490 (Colo. 1966); Walker v. Courier-
Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 234 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev’d on other grounds, 368 F.2d 189 (6th
Cir. 1966).
231. Walker, 417 P.2d at 490.
232. Walker, 246 F. Supp. at 234.
233. Id. at 233-34.
234. Walker, 417 P.2d at 490 (describing Walker as a “public personage”); Walker,
246 F. Supp. at 234 (finding that Walker has “become a ‘public man’” and “interwoven
his personal status into that of a public one”).
235. See Amicus Brief for Tribune Co. at 11 (arguing that “on-the-spot” news report-
ing is prone to error, especially on the scene of “sudden, violent, or tragic happen-
ings”); id. at 8-9 (citing examples of errors in press reports, such as the reported
assassination of several members of Lincoln’s Cabinet at Ford’s Theatre, the report that
all the passengers on the Titanic had survived, and the report that Japanese advance
troops had landed in California when Pearl Harbor was attacked).
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against the Associated Press exceeds the number brought against
the New York Times for its Sullivan advertisement,236 and Walker’s
suits are similarly filed in Southern or border states, presumably in
order to reap the benefit of regional jury sympathy for Walker’s
support of segregation.237  The AP brief in the Supreme Court ar-
gues that “[i]f ever there was a case which . . . requires the exten-
sion of the Sullivan doctrine, this is that case.”238
But when the Court decides to review the Butts suit together
with Walker, the extension issue becomes more complicated be-
cause Wally Butts possesses only one of General Walker’s attributes.
Butts is known to the public by virtue of his position as Athletic
Director at the University of Georgia239 and his past activities as the
Georgia football coach.240  Unlike Walker, Butts did not voluntarily
become involved in a debate about a matter of public concern.
Before being accused of fixing a college football game,241 he is not
236. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278 n.18.  See supra note 93.  For other litigation by
Walker based on the news story involved in the Butts litigation, see cases cited in note
233 and Walker v. Kansas City Star, 406 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1966). See also Brief for Pet’r
Associated Press at 43-44 (Walker’s verdict in Louisiana is upheld on appeal, based on a
finding of actual malice, but the judgment for $3 million dollars is reduced to $75,000).
237. Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 42.
238. Id. at 44.  The Supreme Court briefs in Walker include heated rhetoric on both
sides. Compare Brief for Resp’t Walker at 46-47 (noting that the Warren Commission
found that Lee Harvey Oswald attempted to kill Walker with a mail order rifle and that
it is “a fair inference” that AP reports about Walker were “a contributing factor” in
Oswald’s attempt), with Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 44, 47 (asserting that Walker’s
suits are examples “of the technique of converting the libel laws into weapons” by “hard
core segregationists, in public office and out, to perpetuate a system of racial
segregation”).
239. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (Harlan, J., plurality).  See
supra note 234.
240. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 280.
241. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., plurality).  Butts sued the publisher of the
Saturday Evening Post for a story accusing him of having “fixed” the 1962 football game
in which Alabama defeated Georgia.  The Post’s source overheard a telephone conversa-
tion between Butts and Paul (Bear) Bryant, the head coach of Alabama, during which
Butts gave Bryant Georgia’s plays and defensive patterns.  Several people quoted in the
Post story testified that they had been quoted falsely, and expert witnesses and players
contradicted the Post’s claim that the Alabama team members played in a way that re-
vealed their knowledge of Georgia’s play secrets.  The Post author testified that he knew
the article would ruin Butts’s coaching career.  Butts received a verdict for $60,000 in
general damages and $3 million in punitive damages, which was reduced to $460,000 by
remittitur.  The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Id. at 135-38, 156-58. See gener-
ally JAMES KIRBY, FUMBLE:  BEAR BRYANT, WALLY BUTTS AND THE GREAT COLLEGE FOOT-
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a participant in public debate, or a vortex plaintiff, or a person who
sought to use his leadership and influence to mold public thought
and opinion.  Nor does he meet the criteria of the libel privi-
leges.242  Thus, the Butts suit provides the Court with the opportu-
nity to consider whether the actual malice rule should apply to a
plaintiff solely on the basis of public figure status.243  Justice
Harlan’s plurality opinion declares that that the Court’s purpose in
reviewing the judgments in Butts and Walker is to “consider the im-
pact” of Sullivan on libel actions by “public figures” involved in is-
sues of important public interest.244  However, the failure of the
publisher’s counsel in Butts to address this issue suggests that the
Court’s readiness to employ the public figure concept could not be
easily discerned from pre-Butts precedents or commentary.245
BALL SCANDAL 189, 213 (1986) (concluding that although the Post did not publish with
knowledge of falsity but with good faith and corroboration of various kinds, the jury was
misled by “false testimony, lawyers’ failures to offer evidence, the judge’s exclusion of
evidence that [had] been offered, and various tricks by lawyers,” as well as numerous
strategic errors by counsel for the Post).
242. Butts does not qualify as a person who submitted a controversial position to
the public before the Post published the “football fix” story about him.  Butts arguably is
a public man, based on his role in the management of a public educational institution,
but few courts would extend the honest misstatement of fact privilege beyond public
officials and candidates. See supra notes 76-77.
243. 388 U.S. at 134.  Harlan also notes a conflict among lower courts about the
scope of Sullivan, but does not describe the complexity of the lower courts’ rulings. See
infra text accompanying notes 293-94.
244. Butts, 388 U.S. at 134.
245. See supra note 190.  Wechsler argues that the actual malice rule should extend
to all subjects of “important and legitimate” “public concern,” such as the Post story
about a “fixed” football game, and that Wally Butts qualifies for the actual malice rule as
a public official, given his position as the Athletic Director at the University of Georgia.
See Brief for Pet’r Curtis Publ’g Co. at 51-60; Butts, 388 U.S. at 146 (noting but not
addressing these arguments).  Counsel for the AP argues that Walker qualifies for the
actual malice rule because he fits the Brennan vortex and Friendly participant formu-
las, as well as the Rosenblatt criteria for a person “in a position significantly to influence
the resolution” of public issues, who is “actively attempting through use of their leader-
ship and influence” to “mold public opinion.” See Brief for Pet’r Associated Press at 32-
41; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). See supra text accompanying notes 197-
201.  For commentary on lower court decisions, compare, for example, John A. DeVault
& Alan T. Geiger, Note, Constitutional Law — The Expanding Right to Criticize:  A Post-
Times Analysis, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 700, 707 (1967); Donald R. Adair, Note, Free Speech
and Defamation of Public Persons: The Expanding Doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 419, 423 (1967); Rubin, supra note 84, at 133; McNamara, supra note 77,
at 1449.
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IV. TWO VISIONS FOR A PUBLIC FIGURE PRIVILEGE IN BUTTS AND
THE EMERGENCE OF COUNTER-NARRATIVES
TO CHALLENGE SULLIVAN
Butts is a landmark decision because it marks both the arrival
of the public figure libel privilege in First Amendment law and the
open rebellion by a Court plurality against expanding Sullivan’s ac-
tual malice rule in libel cases.  Although four justices are willing to
provide a lesser First Amendment privilege to defendants sued by
public figures, they argue that such defendants do not deserve pro-
tection when engaging in “highly unreasonable” conduct constitut-
ing an “extreme departure” from ordinary standards of
investigation and reporting.246  This privilege offers an original so-
lution to the extension debate.  It is accompanied by other doctri-
nal surprises in the Harlan opinion, including a reworking of the
Sullivan narratives to justify a shift in First Amendment libel doc-
trine.  Harlan’s repudiation of the actual malice rule requires that
he articulate an alternate rule, as well as new narratives, either to
explain the irrelevance of Sullivan’s reasoning to the Walker and
Butts cases, or to distinguish and limit Sullivan’s scope.
As the designated standard bearer for the expansion of the Sul-
livan doctrine, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion accepts the public
figure label as a tool for identifying the new arena of litigation in
which the actual malice rule will govern.  Rather than engaging in
prolonged rebuttal to Harlan’s revisionist offerings, Warren briefly
opines that the latter’s “unusual and uncertain formulation” can
neither guide a jury nor afford adequate protection for the free
speech and debate required by society.247  Then he sets about the
task of constructing a public figure concept that is connected to the
Sullivan narratives rather than detached from them.  Justice
Harlan’s opinion studiously ignores both Warren’s interpretation
of precedent and his public figure definitions, and Warren’s opin-
ion responds silently in kind.  When the dust settled in Butts, War-
246. Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J., plurality). Compare Kalven, supra note 6, at
299 (criticizing Harlan’s version of a gross negligence standard for making “at a consti-
tutional level more discriminations than two centuries of tort law has worked out at the
common law level”), with J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to
Know:  A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630, 641 (1968) (approv-
ing Harlan’s standard for plaintiff who is not defamed about a “political question”).
247. Butts, 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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ren has narrowly won the standoff over the extension of the actual
malice rule to public figures.  But his opinion defending this posi-
tion is brief and cryptic, and Harlan’s more developed interpreta-
tions of Sullivan’s narratives lays the groundwork for their future
alteration and for continued judicial wrangling over the premises
behind the constitutional protection of libel.
A. The Public Figure Concept of Chief Justice Warren and Its
Roots in Sullivan
The Warren opinion displays a meditative, even disembodied,
tone, which derives from its failure to cite or discuss authorities of
any kind.248  In its silence, much is omitted, as though the three-
year interlude between Sullivan and Butts belongs to a legal culture
resembling Brigadoon, which has vanished and left no residue of
lower court opinions, Supreme Court precedents, or accumulated
scholarly commentary.  Yet the traces of some of these sources may
be detected in the language of the opinion, as they make their invis-
ible contributions to Warren’s definition of a public figure for First
Amendment purposes.249  Notably, certain signature features taken
from Sullivan and its progeny appear in Warren’s opinion, includ-
ing the double helix, the free debate narrative, the Rosenblatt
blueprint, and Blackmun’s leader-influencer concept.  Warren’s
meaningful silences concerning Brennan’s vortex plaintiff and
Friendly’s participant figure are also noteworthy.250  Evidence of
Warren’s purposes for his broad and abstract criteria for public fig-
ure status is supplied by his rejection of the concession narrative of
Rosenblatt, his use of the libel privilege vocabulary of the public
248. See id. at 162-65.
249. The Warren justices support the Court majorities in Sullivan, Garrison, and
Rosenblatt; but after Chief Justice Warren leaves the Court, Justice White later rejects
Justice Brennan’s views, first in Rosenbloom and then in Gertz. Compare Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality), and Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting), with Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 57
(White, J., concurring), and Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
250. For an explanation of these concepts, see supra text accompanying notes 136-
38 (Brennan’s vortex figure); supra text accompanying notes 183-88 (Friendly’s partici-
pant figure).
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man,251 and his avoidance of any recognition of the relevance of
the privacy tort privileges to an expansion of the actual malice rule.
Warren’s preference for relying on uncredited sources, while con-
cealing the originality of some of his arguments, cannot conceal the
links between Sullivan’s principles and the shape and purpose of his
public figure definitions.
Chief Justice Warren begins his defense of the expansion of
Sullivan with his goal firmly in mind, which is to explain why
libelous speech about some public figure plaintiffs must be pro-
tected in the same manner as libelous speech about public officials
under Sullivan.252  He takes for granted the value of the Rosenblatt
blueprint, and borrows its premise that the actual malice rule
should protect libelous statements regarding people who are “in-
volved in the resolution of important public questions.”253 He holds
firmly to the framework of the double helix, as he describes how
speech about public issues and events may focus on “those who do
not hold public office,” when they have the equivalent positions
and power of those who do.254  Warren points to the logic of recog-
nizing that the same “concern to the citizen” exists regarding the
“views and actions” of a public figure and the “attitudes and behav-
iors” of a public official, whenever both characters are involved in
the same issues or events.255  Then Warren shifts to an endorse-
ment of Hill’s principle that freedoms of speech and press are not
“the preserve of political expression or comment upon public af-
fairs,” but extend to “freedom of discussion” that “must embrace all
251. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (echoing Rosenblatt’s lan-
guage, in a new context, in referring to people who are “in a position significantly to
influence the resolution” of “public issues”). See supra text accompanying notes 150-53.
252. The Warren opinion repeatedly qualifies his observations about public figures
to make it clear that he means to refer to a sub-group and not to all public figures as
defined by the publicity privilege.  For example, he states that “many” of them have the
power to be “involved” in resolving public questions or to “shape events,” but implicitly,
not all; he also notes that “often” such people “play an influential role in ordering
society,” but implicitly, not always. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 162.  Warren’s argument reflects Blackmun’s appeal to the absence of a
“rational distinction” between criticism of those who “lead in the determination of na-
tional policy” and criticism of government officials, given the same public interest in
both types of speech. See Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th
Cir. 1966).
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issues about which information is needed.”256  Thus, Warren ties
Sullivan’s free debate narrative to the “rights of the press and the
public to inform and be informed.”257  He argues that public opin-
ion performs the same function in restraining the influence of pub-
lic figures as that performed by popular elections where the
“restraints of the political process” may be used by the public to
influence the conduct of public officials.258  In effect, Warren treats
public opinion itself as a democratic good.
In the spirit of Sullivan, Warren derives his First Amendment
definition of a public figure from the public need for uninhibited
debate about the activities and opinions of those with informal po-
litical and social power.  Like Blackmun, Warren recognizes that
such power may be derived from either position or fame.259  War-
ren also observes that such power provides “ready access” to the
“mass media of communication.”  This access creates the power to
“influence policy” and to “counter criticism” of the “views and activ-
ities” of the power wielder.260  Unlike the Harlan opinion, which
emphasizes that a public figure’s power of access to the media is a
256. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
374, 388 (1967) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). Cf.  Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 272 (“‘The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but
information.’” (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942)).
257. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See supra text accompany-
ing notes 91-96.
258. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (observing that public figures
“are not amenable to restraints of the political process,” so that “public opinion may be
the only instrument by which society” can influence them).  This reference to the politi-
cal process connects Warren’s express recognition of the political power of some public
figures to the Sullivan narratives concerning the value of speech about politics and
government. Cf.  Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (declaring that “‘public discussion is a politi-
cal duty’” and “‘this should be a fundamental principle of American government’”)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
259. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). Cf. Pauling v. Globe-
Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966) (identifying “prominence” as a
source of “influence” in the resolution of public issues, as well as positions that create
the “capacity” to “guide public policy”).
260. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See also id. at 163 (further
recognizing that “the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are
blurred,” so that “power” to make “policy determinations,” once channeled through
“political institutions,” now originates with and is “implemented” through private sector
groups, “some only loosely connected with Government”).
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tool for rebutting libels,261 the Warren opinion views that access as
the means for a public figure to advertise and defend her power
and opinions.  Warren does not connect his vision of public figures
to Brennan’s influence seeker who thrusts herself into the vortex of
public controversy, or to Friendly’s participant in public debate.262
Warren’s public figure is not a player in a high-stakes controversy of
grave or pressing public concern, but only a subject of “legitimate
and substantial” public interest.263  Warren creates no requirements
that a public figure must enter a debate or attract public notice.264
Instead, Warren articulates criteria for a public figure in abstract
generalities, referring to a person’s latent power to play a “role in
ordering society,” “shape events in areas of concern to society,” or
be involved “in public issues and events.”265
Warren’s opinion takes on a more emphatic tone in describing
the virtues of the actual malice rule as applied to his concept of
public figures.  Warren gives no quarter to Justice Stewart’s plea in
Rosenblatt for the Court’s recognition of the constitutional status of
the reputation interests of libel plaintiffs.  Instead, Warren revises
the concession narrative of Rosenblatt by downgrading its valuation
of society’s “pervasive and strong interest” in “redressing attacks
upon reputation” through the libel remedy.266  He characterizes
that interest as a merely “legitimate” one that is “balanced to a
proper degree” by the actual malice rule, which functions as “an
261. See id. at 155 (Harlan, J., plurality) (finding that public figures command “suf-
ficient continuing public interest” to expose the fallacies of defamation through their
access to the media).
262. Warren’s failure to equate Brennan’s vortex figure with public figures is not
surprising because Brennan did not make this connection in his Rosenblatt footnote. See
supra text accompanying notes 201-05.  Moreover, Harlan’s use of the vortex concept
without attribution to Brennan, and Harlan’s declaration that a vortex plaintiff attains
public figure status as reflected in “ordinary tort law principles,” provide Warren with
additional reasons to cede the vortex metaphor to Harlan. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 154-55
(Harlan, J., plurality).
263. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164-65 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
264. Compare supra text accompanying notes 206-08, with supra notes 225-230 (anal-
ysis of pro-extension courts).  Notably, Warren’s definition of a public figure obscures
the question whether public figure status is almost always “voluntarily” assumed, or
whether it may be “involuntarily” acquired, as recognized in Gertz. See supra note 14.
265. Butts, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).  Warren recognizes that the
Walker and Butts plaintiffs are public figures according to his definition. Id. at 165.
266. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966). Cf. supra text accompanying notes
148-50.
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important safeguard” to afford “the necessary insulation for the
fundamental interests” of First Amendment rights.267
Warren’s failure to refer to the publicity privileges is a sign of
his intention to defend the actual malice rule, and to guard its nar-
ratives against the influence of the Harlan opinion’s reinterpreta-
tion of Sullivan.268  Instead of validating Harlan’s reference to the
privacy tort definition of a public figure, Warren treats the public
figure label as a First Amendment term that must be defined using
Sullivan’s rhetorical tradition.  To this end, Warren uses the code
language of the libel privileges employed in Sullivan in describing
Walker as a public man and in arguing that the actual malice rule
will protect First Amendment interests when evenly applied to cases
involving public men.269  Warren also refrains from mentioning any
of the various hints in Sullivan’s progeny cases concerning the use-
fulness of the publicity privileges as a potential source of free
speech protection.270  Warren’s public figure definition is designed
to fit the Sullivan narratives like a carefully tailored glove.  The
Harlan opinion’s definition is not designed for that purpose, and so
Warren discreetly avoids using the doctrinal source material used
by Harlan.
Given the inherent ambiguity of the Warren opinion’s silences
concerning presumptively relevant case law, commentators disagree
about the implications of the Butts opinions.271  Warren describes
Walker as a “public man in whose public conduct society and the
press [have] a legitimate and substantial interest.”272  Some observ-
267. Butts, 388 U.S. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
268. See infra text accompanying notes 293-313.
269. Butts, 388 U.S. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See supra text accompanying
notes 67-68, 109.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 114-41.
271. Cf., e.g., Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment:  The Implica-
tions of Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra note 130, at 951, 952 n.178 (asserting that the Butts
Court is retreating from Hill); Jerome Lawrence Merin, Libel and the Supreme Court, 11
WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 404 (1969) (arguing that Warren’s opinion incorporates Hill’s
expansion of Sullivan); Kalven, supra note 6, at 286 (finding that it is a puzzle why the
Court ignores Hill in Butts and goes “back to Sullivan for guidance”).
272. Butts, 388 U.S. at 165 (Warren, C.J., concurring).  Warren’s opinion does not
explain how Wally Butts fit Warren’s public figure criteria.  For criticism of the Butts
definitions of public figures as vague, see, for example, Note, Public Official and Actual
Malice Standards: The Evolution of New York Times v. Sullivan, 56 IOWA L. REV. 393, 396
(1967) [hereinafter Public Official and Actual Malice Standards]; Philip S. DiMatteo, Note,
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-1\NLR107.txt unknown Seq: 54 20-FEB-06 12:22
134 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
ers notice that Warren’s vocabulary could be detached from his
public figure concept and used to extend the actual malice rule to
all plaintiffs involved in subjects of legitimate public interest.273
The first lower court to take this step issues its ruling soon after
Butts is decided,274 and four years later, a short-lived plurality in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.275 endorses this position. Gertz soon
erases Rosenbloom and revives the public figure concept as the
boundary for the actual malice territory276 in a doctrinal milestone
that marks the end of the first decade of the Sullivan regime.  With
the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to read the Warren opin-
ion in Butts as a stepping stone toward Rosenbloom’s temporary aban-
donment of the public figure category.  But even if Warren’s
opinion is not read this way, it is impossible not to notice the com-
mitment of the opinion to the sociological guesses and First
Amendment values of Sullivan.277
B. Justice Harlan’s Public Figure Concept Based on “Ordinary
Tort Rules” and a Reworking of the Narratives in
Sullivan
Justice Harlan embarks upon a more complicated challenge in
Butts than that faced by the anti-extension courts, which had no
need to define the public figure concept in order to reject the ap-
Times Marches On: The Court’s Continuing Expansion of the Application of the Actual Malice
Standard, 47 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 153, 158 (1971).
273. See, e.g., Henry v. Nickel, Note, The New York Times Rule and Society’s Interest in
Providing a Redress for Defamatory Statements, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 424, 429 (1967) (pre-
dicting that the Warren opinion’s position “logically cannot be restricted to any class of
persons” if free discussion of public issues is the guide); Merin, supra note 271, at 419
(recognizing that the definition of public figure might become so broad that “any mem-
ber of the public who becomes of general interest” will qualify). See supra note 14.
274. United Med. Labs., Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. 258 F. Supp. 735 (D.C.
Or. 1966), aff’d, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968) (extending the Sullivan rule to libelous
speech related to “public health” issues). See Public Official and Actual Malice Standards,
supra note 272, at 398 n.33 (citing eleven cases extending Sullivan rule to suits concern-
ing libelous speech related to public interest).
275. 403 U.S. 29, 43-46 (Brennan, J., plurality) (holding that plaintiffs should have
to prove actual malice when libelous speech involves matter of “general or public con-
cern”). See supra note 13.
276. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 413 U.S. 323 (1974).
277. See Kalven, supra note 6, at 289 (opining that the Court “has done exactly what
would have been predicted from Sullivan, radiating outward gradually by analogy from
the core protection” of that decision).
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plication of the actual malice rule to libel suits by non-official plain-
tiffs.  Justice Harlan’s opinion reveals that he views his two most
important tasks as interconnected ones: to establish a limitation
upon Sullivan by restricting the application of its actual malice rule
to suits by public officials, and to create a new First Amendment
pedigree for a gross negligence standard to be used in place of that
rule.  As part of the latter task, Harlan must define the plaintiff class
to be covered by the new standard and link that definition to the
pedigree for that standard.  The Warren opinion’s public figure
definition, with its references to the public man and its links to the
principles of Sullivan, is not suited to the Harlan’s purposes.  By
contrast, the publicity tort definition of the public figure concept
has no links to Sullivan or to Warren’s opinion.  By citing that defi-
nition, Harlan also can highlight the need to look outside Sullivan
to ordinary tort law principles for a replacement for the actual mal-
ice rule and a definition of the public figure concept.  Harlan’s dis-
cussion of his public figure formula is focused on the attributes of
the plaintiffs in Walker and Butts, and his formula is linked to com-
plex reinterpretations of Sullivan.  Thus, Harlan’s narratives estab-
lish enduring intellectual building blocks for the Court’s
subsequent libel jurisprudence.
During the course of his analysis, Harlan repeatedly uses the
term “public figure” without defining it clearly for First Amend-
ment purposes.  This convenient strategy is also adopted by War-
ren, whose definition of the term emerges only gradually in his
opinion, as expressed through his reasoning concerning the mod-
ern political power of actors in the private sector.278  By contrast,
Justice Harlan’s definition appears in a brief and cryptic passage, at
the end of a long survey of the history of First Amendment law and
libel law, and an overview of carefully selected rationales from Sulli-
van.279  He notes that both Walker and Butts “commanded a sub-
stantial amount of independent public interest,” and hence “would
278. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See
Kalven, supra note 6, at 288 (observing that “with arresting overtones of contemporary
sociology [Warren] argued that there is no longer a sharp difference in modern life
between the governmental and the private”).
279. Butts, 388 U.S. at 146-54 (Harlan, J., plurality).
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have been labeled ‘public figures’” under “ordinary tort rules.”280
He opines that Wally Butts “may have attained that status by posi-
tion alone” because of his job as Athletic Director at Georgia,281
whereas Walker attained that status “by his purposeful activity
amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the ‘vortex’ of an
important public controversy” during the Ole Miss demonstra-
tion.282  In his concluding words on the subject, Harlan observes
that both men “commanded sufficient continuing public interest
and had sufficient access to the means of counterargument ‘to ex-
pose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies’ of the defama-
tory statements.”283
Even when Harlan’s public figure definition is evaluated in a
vacuum, it is evident that he is inventing a new First Amendment
concept out of disparate ideas from different sources, rather than
putting a First Amendment label on a set of pre-existing, interre-
lated tort law elements.284  When Justice Brennan coined the vortex
expression in his Rosenblatt opinion, he did not equate a vortex
plaintiff with a public figure.285  When courts created the public
figure privilege for publicity suits, that privilege was not justified on
the grounds that the plaintiff could seek media access for the
“means of counterargument” to publicize the truth; such plaintiffs
280. See id. at 154-55 (citing Spahn, 221 N.E.2d 543, remanded on other grounds, 387
U.S. 239 (1966)). See also Spahn, 221 N.E.2d at 545, aff’d on reargument, 233 N.E.2d 840
(equating public figures with “newsworthy persons,” and declaring that a public figure,
“whether he be such by choice or involuntarily, is subject to the often searching beam
of publicity,” so that “the law affords his privacy little protection”).  On rehearing, the
Court of Appeals in Spahn affirmed the statutory privacy tort verdict for Warren Spahn
for damages based on publication of fictionalized biography.  Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc., 233 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1967). See also supra note 23.
281. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., plurality).
282. Id.
283. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing)).  Harlan’s descriptions of the different sources of public figure status for Walker
and Butts lead commentators to speculate that different proof requirements may be
created for different types of public figures. See, e.g., James R. Carpenter, Jr., Note,
Constitutional Law—Defamation under the First Amendment—The Actual Malice Test and
“Public Figures,” 46 N.C. L. REV. 392, 398 (1967); Merin, supra note 271, at 421.
284. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 403 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (blending First
Amendment analysis for libel and false light torts with original definitions of public
interest concept and negligence standard). See supra note 151 and supra text accompa-
nying notes 151-52.
285. 383 U.S. at 86 n.12. See supra text accompanying notes 198-202.
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wanted no publicity in the first place, which is why they sought dam-
ages for harm occasioned by the publicity of true facts.286  Justice
Harlan’s endorsement of a public figure privilege only for public
interest speech about public figures reveals that his constitutional
definition is more limited than ordinary tort law rules, which
granted a publicity privilege for all news or information that
arouses public attention.”287  Finally, Harlan’s analysis includes ob-
servations that seem redundant from a torts perspective, such as his
emphasis on Walker’s vortex activities, when Walker would have
earned his public figure status in a publicity suit from prior life ac-
complishments that made him a subject of public interest.288
When Harlan’s public figure definition is taken out of a vac-
uum and considered in the context of his entire Butts opinion, it
becomes more obvious that his distinctive amalgam of definitional
elements is attached to a similar amalgam of rationales.  Harlan’s
narratives in Butts combine elements of Sullivan’s narratives with
new elements that reshape Sullivan’s commitment to the actual
malice rule.  As Harlan reconfigures the narratives of Sullivan, it
becomes easier for him to argue that the actual malice rule should
be limited to public officials, and to propose that other sources of
law should fill the void left by the shrinkage of Sullivan as a re-
source for determining the standard to govern suits by non-official
plaintiffs.  For Harlan, these sources provide the justifications for
adopting the gross negligence standard.  They include First Amend-
ment clear and present danger cases, precedents involving press
rights, common law libel doctrines, criminal law statutes, and ordi-
nary tort law principles.
Justice Harlan begins his opinion by sidestepping the lower
courts’ extension jurisprudence, while noting that “a sharp division
of opinion” exists among lower courts as to whether Sullivan is lim-
ited to public officials or “has a longer reach.”289  Harlan’s decision
286. See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
287. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
288. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 140 (Harlan, J., plurality) (observing
that Walker “could fairly be deemed a man of some political prominence”). Cf. Walker
v. Courier-Journal, 246 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Ky. 1965), rev’d, 368 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.
1966) (taking judicial notice that Walker’s “public life is generally well known to the
people of this Nation”).
289. Butts, 388 U.S. at 134 (Harlan, J., plurality).
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to ignore the substance of the lower court decisions is understanda-
ble, given their lack of support for either his gross negligence privi-
lege or his decision to detach his public figure formula from
Warren’s sources.290  In more subtle gestures of cleaning the histor-
ical slate, Harlan incorporates the ideas of Friendly, Brennan, and
Blackmun into his introductory analysis.  But he does this without
explaining that all of them favored extension of the actual malice
rule, and that none of them employed a public figure concept
rooted in the privacy tort tradition.291  Harlan explains that his
fresh inquiry into “the relationship between libel law and the free-
dom of speech and press”292 is required in order to avoid granting
the press either too much or too little immunity “for the infliction
of needless injury upon honor and reputation through false publi-
cation.”293  Contrary to the Warren opinion’s judgment that the ac-
tual malice rule achieves the proper balance between free speech
interests and tort interests,294 Harlan’s opinion concludes that the
290. See supra notes 161-174 and accompanying text.  Harlan’s gross negligence
privilege is not an option that lower court judges consider before Butts; they assume
that the extension debate concerns the “all or nothing” issue as to whether to extend
the actual malice rule to public figures.  Lower courts consistently reject the argument
that a plaintiff’s public figure status is enough alone to trigger the actual malice rule.
See supra text accompanying notes 204-06.  Harlan would have agreed with that point of
view because of his rejection of the actual malice rule, but his opinion envisions that a
person’s public figure status is enough alone to trigger his proposed gross negligence
privilege. See Butts, 388 U.S. at 155 (Harlan, J., plurality).
291. Harlan’s allusions to Friendly’s position are the most misleading ones. See
Kalven, supra note 6, at 286-87 n.51 (noting that Harlan quotes an observation by
Friendly that makes it appear that he is discussing the “risks of tort liability [that] are to
be placed on publishers,” when the context of the comment relates to a jurisdictional
issue; Harlan also ignores Friendly’s support for using the actual malice rule for a non-
official “participant in a debate on an issue of grave public concern”); Butts, 388 U.S. at
147 (Harlan, J., plurality) (citing Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d
Cir. 1967)).  Harlan’s citation to Blackmun’s view is taken out of the context of Black-
mun’s Pauling opinion so as to ignore Blackmun’s conclusions. See id. at 148 (stating
that criticism of private leader figures and public officials is equally important to the
public interest) (citing Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publ’g Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th
Cir. 1966)).  Harlan’s use of Brennan’s vortex concept ignores the fact that Brennan
never equated his concept with the public figure term. Compare id. at 155, with supra
text accompanying notes 198-202.
292. Butts, 388 U.S. at 135 (Harlan, J., plurality).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 164 (Warren, C. J., concurring).
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actual malice standard should not be granted an “unintended inex-
orability” or “blind application.”295
Harlan’s central moment of engagement with the Warren
opinion comes with his declaration that “none of the particular
considerations involved” in Sullivan are present in Butts because
suits by public figures are not analogous “to prosecutions for sedi-
tious libel,” because libel judgments for public figures do not vindi-
cate “governmental policy,” and because public figures do not enjoy
a “special privilege” protecting their utterances “against accounta-
bility in libel.”296  This set of distinctions exemplifies three of
Harlan’s strategies for reworking the Sullivan narratives.  One of
those strategies is to select a Sullivan rationale and then to prune
away other rationales so as to deprive them of doctrinal signifi-
cance.  Here Harlan isolates the Sedition Act narrative from other
narratives that apply equally to official and non-official plaintiffs, in
order to portray Sullivan as possessing only  a few core rationales
instead of a web of multiple justifications.297  A second strategy is to
implant a non-Sullivan rationale into a discussion of actual ratio-
nales from Sullivan; here, the vindication of government policy that
might be discerned in a public official’s favorable libel verdict is a
new argument for limiting the Sullivan privilege to critics of offi-
cials.  When Harlan, like Warren, remains silent about the prove-
nance of rationales, their novelty is concealed.  A third technique
used by Harlan is to ignore the Court’s interpretations of Sullivan
in the progeny cases, which is what Harlan does in rejecting, with-
out citation, Rosenblatt’s retraction of the official privilege ratio-
nale.298  Harlan’s amalgam of rationales creates a “public official”
narrative that can serve, in its simplicity, as a distilled version of a re-
295. Id. at 147-48 (Harlan, J., plurality). Id. at 147 (declaring that an “accommoda-
tion” between the interests of the press and libeled plaintiffs is necessary “in all libel
actions arising from a publication concerning public issues”). Cf. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (opining that “we believe that the [Sullivan] rule
states an accommodation between [the interest of the press and broadcast media] and
the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public
persons”).
296. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 85-112; supra note 103.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 130-41; supra note 223.
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imagined Sullivan doctrine in which other narratives recede into
invisibility without explicit rejection.299
Harlan exercises care in selectively citing Sullivan narratives
that support a limitation on the actual malice rule, as illustrated by
his omission of references to Sullivan’s narratives concerning self-
censorship, free debate, and the libelous climate in the arena of
robust debate about public issues.300  Yet occasionally Harlan’s
opinion incorporates an idea that could be used to argue for the
similarity of public officials and public figures, rather than for their
differences.  Harlan’s most significant contributions to libel juris-
prudence include the arguments in his Hill dissent that “access to
the means of counterargument” through publicized rebuttals to li-
bel may serve as an alternate libel remedy, and that those who lack
media access therefore have a greater need of generous liability
rules for libel actions.301  Harlan was not the first to recognize that
public counterargument could be viewed as a real or symbolic alter-
native to a libel action for plaintiffs who could not satisfy the actual
malice standard.302  But Harlan deserves some credit for the Gertz
Court’s adoption of the argument that it is unfair to impose the
actual malice rule on private figures who lack access to the means
of exposing the falsity of libels about them.303  However, when
299. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
300. These are the very rationales that led some of the lower courts to extend the
actual malice rule to some non-official plaintiffs. See supra text accompanying notes
211-21.
301. See supra text accompanying note 152.
302. See, e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 304-05 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring)
(arguing that “counterargument” is a “weapon available to expose” falsity and a “public
official certainly has equal if not greater access than most private citizens to media of
communication”); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(noting that many people who were damaged by “false, abusive” charges in the “1940’s
and 1950’s,” “unlike the officials in Sullivan who ran for election, rarely had opportu-
nity for rejoinder”).  See also Lewis, supra note 7, at 132 (observing that at oral argument
in Sullivan, Wechsler reminded the Court that public officials may rely on their privi-
lege to make speeches to answer libelous charges).
303. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974). Contra Kalven,
supra note 6, at 299-300 (criticizing Harlan’s idea because “[i]t is a doubtful reading of
[Sullivan] to see it resting so heavily on a concern with counterargument,” since “we
look to counterargument as the correct remedy for the mischief of false and pernicious
ideas and doctrine” but “these notions sound only the faintest echo when we turn to
false statements of fact about individuals”); Cohen, supra note 16, at 377-77 (opining
that public officials and public figures cannot fully protect their reputations without
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Harlan adopts the element of “access to counterargument” as a cri-
terion for his public figure definition, he overlooks the logical con-
sequence of imposing his own Hill theory on the Butts and Walker
plaintiffs.  If access to counterargument is a justification for impos-
ing the actual malice rule on public officials, who presumably have
media access, then the actual malice rule should be imposed simi-
larly on public figures with media access, rather than Harlan’s gross
negligence standard.
Harlan prefers to ignore rationales from the Sullivan progeny
cases that do not fit the goal of his “public official” narrative to
create a restraining boundary around the actual malice rule.  For
example, Harlan notes that Rosenblatt applied the actual malice rule
to a plaintiff who had a position in which the public had an
independent interest, and then he argues that the actual malice
rule is not appropriate for public figures because they do not have
positions in the way that public officials do.304  But Harlan does not
mention the existence of the Rosenblatt blueprint, which can be
used to make analogies between public figures and officials when
both types of plaintiffs “are in a position significantly to influence
the resolution” of “public issues.”305  In effect, Harlan interprets Ro-
senblatt narrowly in order to reduce its potential as a doctrinal re-
source for addressing the extension of Sullivan to public figures.
He applies a similar shrinking process to Sullivan’s theory for the
constitutional protection of false speech.  Harlan again borrows
from his Hill dissent, in emphasizing that false speech does not de-
serve First Amendment protection, except insofar as its protection
might aid the protection of true speech.306  This observation down-
plays Sullivan’s finding that even false and defamatory speech must
be protected through the availability of a defense “for erroneous
using libel suits, and that “the obscure citizen” has no greater need “for a forum to
vindicate his reputation”).
304. Butts, 388 U.S. at 153-54 (Harlan, J., plurality) (citing Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at
86).
305. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85 (observing that the actual malice rule is required
for persons who “are in a position significantly to influence the resolution” of “public
issues”).
306. 385 U.S. at 405 (citing Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64 (1964)). See supra text accompanying notes 142-43. Accord Gertz, 418 U.S. at
340 (“[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact” but we must “protect
some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.”).
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statements honestly made.”307  Harlan omits this point because he
wishes to portray the “misconduct” of all false critics as being the
same, and to argue that the characteristics of public officials and
public figures justify different “balances” between reputation inter-
ests and free speech interests.308  Different balances can lead conve-
niently to confinement of the actual malice rule to the sphere of
libel actions by public officials.
Once Harlan defines his public figure formula as an amalgam
that has little connection with Sullivan, then his search outside Sulli-
van for a proof standard for public figures is evidently necessary.
To this end, Harlan looks to the backdrop of law that is left un-
touched by Sullivan, such as judicial “loss shifting” rules, “neutral”
and “generally applicable regulatory measures,”309 theft statutes,
and common law doctrines that classify libel “in the same class with
the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals.”310
Harlan invokes First Amendment precedent to express sentiments
that represent the antithesis of the spirit of Sullivan: the publisher
of a newspaper “has no special privilege to invade the rights and
liberties of others.”311  Yet none of his sources point directly to the
correctness of Harlan’s novel standard allowing damages for public
figures based on “a showing of highly unreasonable conduct consti-
tuting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”312
Any gap between Harlan’s rationales and their connection to his
chosen proof standard can be filled by relying on sociological
guesses lightly made.
CONCLUSION
The historical reasons for the public figure definitions in First
Amendment libel doctrine, as established in the Butts opinions, are
largely invisible in our era.  Warren and Harlan duel sharply over
307. 376 U.S. at 272-73.
308. Butts, 388 U.S. at 154 (Harlan, J., plurality). Id. at 153 (“[I]mproper conduct
should result in impositions that strike a fair balance between a plaintiff’s interest in
recompense and society’s interest in freedom of speech.”).
309. Id. at 152-54.
310. Id. at 152 (quoting PROSSER, supra note 2, § 108, at 72).
311. Id. at 150 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
312. Id. at 155.
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the nuances between speech concerning public interest issues
about a public figure who commands substantial public interest,
and speech about public issues and events that relate to public
figures who are involved in public questions.  The conflict among
the Butts justices may seem almost indecipherable to modern legal
eyes, but an understanding of the libel and publicity privileges, as
well as an examination of lower court jurisprudence and pre-Butts
precedent, go some way toward bringing the differences between
Warren and Harlan to light.  The broad tort connotation of a pub-
lic figure has remained a part of the legal vernacular over the de-
cades since Sullivan, even as the particulars of its constitutional
meaning evolved during the era between Butts and Gertz, and
continue to evolve in modern post-Gertz law.  Given the richness
and elusiveness of the public figure concept, it seems destined to
vacillate in its meaning, as a permanent moving target, as long as it
retains the role of expressing hotly contested compromises over the
clash of free speech interests and the ancient interest in reputation
protected by libel law.
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